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ABSTRACT
In a quartet of recent decisions, the Supreme Court
substantially reshaped the analysis of due process limits for a
state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over corporations for the
first time since its groundbreaking 1945 decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The Court's decision
quartet recasts the International Shoe continuum of corporate
contacts for which it would be "reasonable" for the state to
exercise jurisdiction based on "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" into a more rigid bright-line dichotomy
between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction: for a state to
exercise general (or all-purpose) jurisdiction over any suit,
regardless of the suit's connection to the state, the company must
be essentially "at home" in the jurisdiction, generally requiring
that the company be incorporated or have its principal place of
business there. Otherwise, the court must have "specific"
jurisdiction, in which the claims of each plaintiff must "arise out
of or relate to" the company's contacts with the state. Justice
Sotomayor issued concurring and dissenting opinions warning
that the Court's new approach could seriously curtail nationwide
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class action and mass tort litigation involving corporate
wrongdoing, particularly in cases involving foreign country
corporations, multiple corporate defendants, and smaller
claimants.
Given the critical importance of personal jurisdiction as a
gatekeeper for access to our courts, this Article analyzes the
changes to International Shoe introduced by the decision quartet
as applied to class actions, mass actions, and other large-scale
litigation. It concludes that the Supreme Court's decision quartet
will reduce forum shopping, that there should continue to be
meaningful access to the courts for nationwide or multi-state
aggregate litigation, and that other options, such as state-wide-
only suits brought in states in which plaintiffs are injured,
together with nationwide federal Multidistrict Litigation
("MDL') centralization and federal/state court coordination,
will also still be available and will often present a better
alternative given choice-of-law and other challenges with
nationwide and multi-state actions. However, this Article also
addresses the very real threats that some courts may too narrowly
apply the decision quartet's new tests or apply the tests so as to
insulate foreign country companies from jurisdiction. To address
these threats, more flexible approaches are proposed for
deserving cases with respect to both the decision quartet's "at
home" requirement for general jurisdiction and the quartet's
"arising out of or related to" requirement for specific jurisdiction.
It is also proposed that for nationwide or multistate class actions,
courts should apply a presumption that considers only the claims
of the named plaintiffs for the specific jurisdiction claim-
connectedness requirement, rather than the claims of each absent
class member, which is similar to how federal diversity
jurisdiction is already tested only for the named plaintiffs in
class actions, although defendants should be permitted to rebut
the presumption by showing that the forum state bears
insufficient connection to absent class members to satisfy the
reasonableness requirement for the assertion of specific
jurisdiction on a class-wide basis. Finally, addressing a
troublesome topic concerning which the Supreme Court appears
closely divided, it is proposed that a foreign company's systematic
"fifty-state" sales targeting be treated as a 'ourposeful"
jurisdictional contact with any state where substantial injury is
caused to the plaintiff by the targeting.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent quartet of unanimous and nearly
unanimous decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,' Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,3 and
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California4 have substantially
recalibrated the analysis of Fourteenth Amendment due process limits
for a State's exercise of personal jurisdiction over corporations
established more than eight decades ago in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.5 The Court's more divided 4-2-3 decision in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6 during the same period has heightened
concern about the realities of establishing jurisdiction over foreign
companies in an increasingly global marketplace. Other scholars have
written about one or more of these decisions, 7 and important suggestions
have been proffered for Congressional legislation or Federal Rules
amendments to create nationwide personal jurisdiction for federal
district court cases, all in an effort to correct perceived limitations in the
Supreme Court's approach. 8 This article presents a real-world
1. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
2. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
3. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
4. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
5. 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945).
6. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
7. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2):
A Way to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413 (2017)
[hereinafter Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)]; Patrick J.
Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts
Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011) [hereinafter Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test]; Meir Feder, Goodyear,
"Home" and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671
(2012); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court's New Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107 (2015); Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-
Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207 (2014);
Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1301
(2014); Craig Sanders, Note, Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine
Consent, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1323 (2017).
8. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 417
(proposing Rule amendment to allow nationwide diversity and alienage jurisdiction); Sachs,
supra note 7, at 1303-04 (proposing new statute providing nationwide federal personal
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examination of the decision quartet's potential impact on the landscape
of class actions, mass actions and other corporate litigation against the
backdrop of how courts were previously addressing corporate personal
jurisdiction, offering a mostly positive prognosis for the quartet's impact,
and providing specific recommendations for how courts should address
future application of the decision quartet so as not to deprive deserving
plaintiffs of a reasonable forum.
As just about every lawyer still alive today learned at the outset of
first-year Civil Procedure class, International Shoe introduced the
minimum contacts-based, "fair play and substantial justice" analysis for
personal jurisdiction.9 Basing its analysis on the quality and quantity of
corporate contacts with a state, the International Shoe opinion proffered,
in substance, a continuum. At one end were contacts with a state clearly
evincing the proper assertion of jurisdiction such as the company's
"home," "principal place of business" or where it has "continuous
corporate operations . . . so substantial and of such a nature" as to allow
jurisdiction over any lawsuit against it thereO-what later came to be
labeled as "general," all-purpose jurisdiction. Further along the
continuum were lesser contacts such as "when the activities of the
corporation . . . have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on""1 and even some "single or occasional
acts" in the state that "because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render
the corporation liable to suit"1 2-which later came to be labeled as
"specific," claim-connected jurisdiction. Ultimately, at the very other end
of the continuum were contacts with the state that were too fleeting and
unrelated to the lawsuit to justify jurisdiction.13 International Shoe was
followed by the enactment of long-arm jurisdiction statutes in all states,
jurisdiction); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling
Act, U.C.L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1, 57-60 and n.30). Otherwise,
"[flederal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction."
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) ("service of process is effective over a
defendant 'who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located."' (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). The federal
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Procedure, at its April 10, 2018 meeting, discussed
the issue but opted to defer active work on such changes relating to personal jurisdiction
for future consideration. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, MNINUTES
32 (April 10, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04- 10-
cvminutes final 0.pdf.
9. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923-24(2011).
10. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945).
11. Id. at 317.
12. Id. at 318.
13. Id. at 317-18.
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and led to decades of litigation and commentary over how much "doing
business" in a state should be required for the exercise of general,
all-purpose jurisdiction and how much connection a state must have to
the plaintiffs' claims in a lawsuit for the exercise of specific, claim-related
jurisdiction.14 In particular, the post-International Shoe courts commonly
allowed general jurisdiction over corporations based upon the company
doing "continuous and substantial business" in the state. 15
The Court's recent decision quartet substantially recasts
the International Shoe corporate jurisdictional continuum into a more
bright-line, simple dichotomy that is both reflective of the
post-International Shoe concepts of general versus specific jurisdiction as
well as more protective against forum shopping, which was a key
backdrop to each of the quartet cases. 16 Under this new dichotomy, for a
company to be subject to general jurisdiction, the firm must be essentially
"at home" in the state such as being incorporated or having its principal
place of business there.17 Otherwise, the only constitutionally
permissible exercise of jurisdiction over a non-consenting corporation,
even one doing substantial continuous business in the state, will need to
be specific jurisdiction for which each plaintiffs claims must "aris[e] out
of or relat[e] to" the company's contacts with the state.18 Under the
14. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp, Buck Logan, Loretta Lynch,
Steve Neuwirth & Jim O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
721 (1988); Walter W. Heiser, A Minimum Interest Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (2000); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-
Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (2001); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction]; Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1125, 1141-44 (1966).
15. See, e.g., Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (N.C. 1977)
(upholding general jurisdiction over a New York based coin dealer for a breach of
employment claim brought by a North Carolina resident based on unrelated sales of rare
coins to at least twenty-seven North Carolina residents); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l,
227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967) (upholding general jurisdiction over English subsidiary of
Hilton for New York resident injured in England due to "doing business" in the state
through advertising and marketing in New York by parent company through other Hilton
affiliates); Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 7, at 104-05 (the law was so well settled that
companies doing large volumes of continuous business in a state did not contest general
jurisdiction, with MBUSA in the Daimler case being a prime example).
16. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132-33 (2014).
17. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
18. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). Professor Twitchell used
the term "dichotomy" to describe the general-specific categorization. Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 611. She argued that "[u]sed correctly, the
general/specific dichotomy has helped courts focus on their reasons for exercising
jurisdiction in particular cases." Id. However, she lamented that courts had confused and
jumbled the two categories. Id. She ultimately proposed a much broader, more flexible and
2018] A NEW GUARD AT THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
decision quartet's new dichotomy, moreover, the Court made clear that
general jurisdiction should be the exception to the rule, meaning that
ordinarily jurisdiction should be specific jurisdiction that ties the suit
itself to the defendant company's contacts with the forum state. 19
The fact that the Court's quartet of decisions are either unanimous
(Goodyear, Daimler) or nearly unanimous (8-1 in BNSF and
Bristol-Myers) demonstrates a very strong level of agreement on the new
brighter-line approach that cuts across the Court's other notable
cleavages.20 Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor, in strongly worded
dissents in Bristol-Myers and BNSF and in her concurring opinion in
Daimler, argued that the Court's new, "restrictive" approach will make it
"difficult," and in some instances "impossible," for plaintiffs to bring
nationwide mass actions addressing nationwide corporate conduct,
particularly if the cases involve either foreign country corporations or two
or more defendants that are "at home" in different states.21 Therefore,
Justice Sotomayor argued, the Court's new approach will make it more
difficult to "aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose
claims may be worth little alone."22
Justice Sotomayor's concerns certainly merit pause for reflection
because no person should be left without meaningful access to an
appropriate court to redress injury. However, this article will seek to
demonstrate that for most cases, the Court's decision quartet, if properly
applied, should not threaten access by plaintiffs to the courts. For most
cases, there will still be appropriate state and federal courts in which
nationwide and multiple-state actions can be brought against corporate
defendants, on either a class action or mass action basis, including a
defendant's "at home" state, and the states where the allegedly harmful
product or communication was designed, manufactured, managed, or
tested or from which the product or communication was distributed or
where the defendant's national marketing campaign was developed. For
multiple defendants sued together, an action could also be brought in the
"fairness"-centered analysis for specific jurisdiction in place of courts blurring the waters
between general and specific jurisdiction. Id. at 662-65, 680.
19. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780; Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
supra note 14, at 628.
20. See BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1554 (2017); Bristol-Myers, 137
S. Ct. at 1778; Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at
421.
21. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560-61 (Sotomayor, J., concurring and dissenting);
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Daimler, 571 U.S. at 143
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
22. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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states in which the defendants engaged together in the subject conduct
at issue, in addition to the other states that overlap.
Moreover, this article will make the important point that a
nationwide class action or mass action will not necessarily be the most
just, speedy, efficient, and cost-effective format for the resolution of every
case concerning even nationwide-impacting corporate conduct, as there
are important values and choice-of-law benefits in local resolution of local
citizens' claims (and local defenses related to such claims). 23 Sometimes
the better choice in aggregate litigation may consist of state-wide-only
actions brought only on behalf of state residents, utilizing a number of
effective and flexible tools available for litigants to achieve nationwide or
multi-state coordination of such actions through effective use of Federal
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") centralization, as well as time-tested
approaches for federal-state court coordination of similar cases that can
allow parties to benefit from both nationwide pre-trial coordination and
localized trials.
Nevertheless, there is a compelling need for courts in applying the
new brighter-line tests adopted in the decision quartet to be careful not
to allow the four decisions, which all dealt with instances of clear forum
shopping, to deprive deserving plaintiffs of an appropriate forum for
litigation against a company with sufficient purposeful contact(s) with
the forum. 24 As Professor Richman warned decades before the decision
quartet, limiting allowable personal jurisdiction to just the two
paradigms of general and specific jurisdiction has the danger of leaving
cases in between the two that fail to meet either paradigm despite the
fact that they offer compelling contacts that come up just short in each. 25
There is a danger that states that had previously narrowly applied the
availability of specific jurisdiction, while broadly applying a "substantial-
and-continuous-doing-business" test for general jurisdiction, will now
23. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co., v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-23 (1985) (choice
of law is a due process consideration in class actions) ; Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir. 1996) (choice of law is an important consideration in the
predominance inquiry in Rule 23(b)(3) multistate class actions); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
24. See generally Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of
the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 7, at 1246.
25. See William M. Richman, Review Essay: Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil
Actions, Part II-A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific
Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1340-46 (1984) (suggesting that a continuum or sliding
scale approach to personal jurisdiction would help fill the gaps between the two paradigms
of general and specific jurisdiction). But see Christian E. Mammen, Note, Here Today, Gone
Tomorrow: The Timing of Contacts for Jurisdiction and Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 707, 717-20 (1993) (arguing for separate treatment of general and specific
jurisdiction rather than a continuum).
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continue their narrow specific jurisdiction approach even as the Supreme
Court's decision quartet has removed "substantial-and-continuous-doing-
business" as grounds for general jurisdiction.26 And, finally, there is the
danger that the courts will over-read the limits on general jurisdiction
imposed by the decision quartet's "at home" test to preclude jurisdiction
over foreign country corporations.
For these reasons, this article proposes a number of approaches to
prevent unwarranted deprivation of a reasonable forum for deserving
plaintiffs. For example, Bristol-Myers requires that all joined plaintiffs
in a specific jurisdiction case against a company have a claim that
"aris[es] out of or relate[s] to" the defendant [company's] contacts with
the state in which suit is brought,27 but it does not prevent courts from
applying a more flexible claim connection test when warranted by the
given case, such as only requiring a "but for" connection rather than
"proximate cause," or other more restrictive claim connection standard. 28
Similarly, if necessary to allow access to a reasonable forum for injuries
sustained in this country, general "at home" jurisdiction could be
permitted over a foreign multinational company with a substantial
United States "quasi-home base" state such as the state of its principal
United States subsidiary or division. 29 This proposed flexibility will still
protect against forum shopping by requiring that all plaintiffs must have
the appropriate claim-connection to the forum or for the corporation to be
essentially at home. This will also protect plaintiffs from a scenario in
which they could "slip between" the decision quartet's bright-line general
versus specific dichotomy and thus be deprived of access to a United
States forum.
26. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 129-32 (2001) [hereinafter Borchers, The Problem with General
Jurisdiction] (suggesting that general jurisdiction has been expanded by the courts because
of irrational narrowness specific jurisdiction decisions); Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 637-39 (same).
27. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014)).
28. See infra Parts III.A., III.E.
29. See infra Parts III.A., III.E. von Mehren and Trautman defined "home base" as the
place of incorporation, the principal place of business or corporate headquarters. von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1179; see also Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 618-20. It is proposed that a "quasi-home base" could, in the
appropriate case involving harm caused to United States residents, be the United States
headquarters of a foreign country multi-national corporation or a United States corporate
division headquarters for the product, service or communication involved in the case. See
infra Part III.E; see, e.g., Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26,
at 137 (advocating allowing general jurisdiction for a company "branch" in appropriate
cases).
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In addition, this article will discuss, and propose a solution to, the
fifty-state sales targeting dilemma presented in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro,30 in which a foreign corporation targets its sales and
marketing to all fifty states but does not otherwise have contacts with
the state where its product was purchased and caused injury.31 In a
nutshell, it is proposed that a company that affirmatively targets its sales
to all fifty states should be deemed to have purposeful specific jurisdiction
contacts with any state in which injury is caused for purposes of suit on
that injury.32
Organizationally, this article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of
International Shoe, and modern, minimum contacts-based corporate
jurisdictional analysis by the Supreme Court and lower courts before the
decision quartet, including how the Supreme Court struggled in
J. McIntyre with the fifty-state targeting dilemma. Next, Part II presents
the quartet decisions in Goodyear, Daimler, BNSF, and Bristol-Myers,
and how they transformed the continuum drawn in International Shoe
into a much brighter-line dichotomy between general and specific
jurisdiction, with stricter tests for each. Finally, Part III presents various
important questions, as well as posited answers, concerning the
application of these decisions in today's complex corporate litigation,
such as (a) how much flexibility is afforded by the new brighter-line tests
of whether a company is essentially "at home" for general jurisdiction and
whether a plaintiffs claim "arises out of or relates to" the company's
contacts with the state for specific jurisdiction; (b) how will the decision
quartet's dichotomy impact class actions; (c) how will the four decisions
impact mass tort actions and other similar aggregate litigation; (d) what
role can Federal MDL centralization and other existing procedural
devices play in ensuring fair and efficient resolution of corporate conduct
with national or multi-state impact; (e) how to address Justice
Sotomayor's concerns about the decision quartet restricting aggregate
litigation against corporations; (f) how to address the J. McIntyre
fifty-state sales targeting dilemma; and (g) whether the decision quartet
will lead to more intense jurisdictional discovery, and how opposing
counsel can (and should) attempt to work together to resolve corporate
jurisdictional issues. While the article concludes that the overall impact
of the decision quartet should be largely positive, recommendations are
offered for necessary flexibility in applying these decisions to protect
access at the courthouse door.
30. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
31. See id. at 882-83.
32. See infra Part IH.E.
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1. INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND MODERN PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
A. The "Canonical" International Shoe Decision
The Supreme Court's groundbreaking decision in International Shoe
changed the reigning in personam jurisdiction analysis from the question
of whether the State has physical power over a defendant by virtue of
physical presence and service of process (or consent), as articulated in the
Court's decision in Pennoyer v. Neff,33 to the question of whether the
person's contacts with the state are of such a quality and quantity that it
would be fundamentally fair and reasonable that the person be subjected
to jurisdiction, either for a particular claim (what today is known as
specific jurisdiction) or for all claims (what today is known as generaljurisdiction).34 Justice Ginsburg in Goodyear described International
Shoe as "the canonical opinion in this area."35
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court held that the State of
Washington could, consistent with due process, exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, International Shoe Company, a Missouri-
headquartered Delaware corporation, for claims seeking payments for
Washington's unemployment fund based on the earnings of the
company's Washington-based sales agents. 36 Although the company
maintained no manufacturing or offices in the state, and accepted and
shipped all orders from St. Louis, the company employed between eleven
and thirteen salespersons who resided in, promoted, and took orders for
shoes in Washington, albeit all under the supervision of St. Louis sales
managers and without any authority to enter into contracts or make
collections.37 All orders were accepted or rejected, and if accepted, were
filled, in St. Louis.38
In an opinion by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the Court held
that due process permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over an
33. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
34. Law students often begin their study of personal jurisdiction with Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877). There, the Court held that an Oregon court's in personam judgment on
an Oregon lawyer's contract claim against a non-resident client (Neff) was entered without
due process, and was therefore an invalid basis for a later execution on the client's in-state
property, because the client was not personally served with process in the state and did not
voluntarily consent to jurisdiction there. Id. Pennoyer has never been overruled, and in
effect, survives as the basis for jurisdiction by virtue of physical presence. Indeed, in
Daimler, Justice Ginsburg makes clear that the roots of "at home" general jurisdiction over
corporations remain in Pennoyer. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 131-33 (2014).
35. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011).
36. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).
37. Id. at 313-14.
38. Id.
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out of state defendant corporation if it has "sufficient contacts" with the
state "to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to
enforce the obligations" sued upon.39 In this respect, the Court went on,
the question to be answered is whether the "nature and level of contacts"
with the state "make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there," adding that "[a]n 'estimate of the
inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away
from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection." 40 The Court also noted that a corporation's contacts that give
rise to benefits from the state should also subject the company to the
obligation to respond to suits arising out of such contacts.41
The Court thus portrayed a continuum of potential contacts that a
company might have with a state and with the particular suit at issue.
42
Throughout the opinion, the Court assumed that a corporation can
always be sued in its "home" state, or its "principal place of business"
irrespective of whether the suit at issue arose out of contacts with the
state.43 The Court also pointed out that "there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities."44
These contacts foreshadowed what later came to be termed general
jurisdiction. The Court correspondingly held that corporate jurisdictional
'"presence' . . . has never been doubted when the activities of the
corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liabilities sued on."45 Further, the Court held that even
some "single or occasional acts" in the state, "because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed
sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit"46-foreshadowing
what today is called specific jurisdiction. Finally, theCourt noted, "it
has been generally recognized that the [mere] casual presence of [a]
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated . . . activities in
39. Id. at 320.
40. Id. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
41. Id. at 319-20.
42. See id. at 316-17.
43. Id. at 317 ("An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in
this connection." (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 317.
46. Id. at 318.
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a state . . . are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there."47
It is clear from the language of the decision that International Shoe
posited that corporate jurisdictional contacts with the state and claims
at issue exist in a continuum:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit and those which do not cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative .... Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.48
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that International Shoe's
continuous and systematic contacts with the state of Washington
through its sales agents employed there were the very basis for
Washington State's unemployment tax enforcement claims against the
company and that, therefore, the State's exercise of jurisdiction satisfied
due process.49 Thus, the actual holding in International Shoe was on the
claim-connected end of its posited contacts-based jurisdictional
continuum. However, the clear message of International Shoe, taught to
several generations of lawyers, was that the new world of minimum-
contacts-based jurisdictional analysis was based on a flexible and
substantive analysis of degrees of corporate contacts with the state and
the claims at issue in which "the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do
not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."50
B. The World of Modern Corporate Personal Jurisdiction Before the
Decision Quartet
In the years following International Shoe, states enacted long arm
statutes extending personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations "doing
business" in the state, either to the maximum extent allowed by due
47. Id. at 317.
48. Id. at 319. Professors Rhodes and Robertson similarly point out that International
Shoe identified three points a scale at which jurisdiction could properly be found, not just
two. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 235.
49. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
50. Id. at 319.
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process, or over various broad categories of contacts with the state.
51 The
lack of a bright-line test in International Shoe as to what contacts
constituted "continuous corporate operations within a state . . . so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action . . . entirely distinct from those activities"
52 led to decades of
litigation and debate over how continuous or substantial a corporation's
"doing business" within a state other than its state of incorporation or
principal place of business would allow for that state's exercise of general,
all-purpose jurisdiction over it.53 In addition, a number of states enacted
"doing business" registration statutes that required companies' consent
to the appointment of an agent for service of process and to general
jurisdiction in the courts of the state as a condition of registration.54 At
the other end of the International Shoe continuum, a great deal of
litigation and academic debate also focused on what quality of claim
connection would be required for the exercise of claim-specific
jurisdiction. 55
Professors von Mehren and Trautman, in 1966, first coined the terms
"general" and "specific" for the two key categories of jurisdiction
51. Richard A. Barsotti, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Individuals: A
Long-Arm Statute Proposed for California, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 313, 317-19 (1969)
(crediting New York and Illinois for having developed different prototype long-arm statutes
in 1956 and 1957, the Illinois statute providing for jurisdiction to limits of due process and
New York's specifying categories of transacting business in New York that will give rise to
jurisdiction); see also Robert D. Nussbaum, The Shortcomings of New York's Long-Arm
Statute: Defamation in the Age of Technology, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 175, 176 (2014).
52. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318.
53. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 122, 127-28
(The New York "doing business" statute is "notoriously indeterminate and seems to exist
without regard for supposed due process limits" and noting other examples of inconsistency
in application of "doing business" general jurisdiction). See generally Twitchell, Why We
Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 14; Twitchell, The Myth
of General Jurisdiction, supra note 14; Brilmayer et al., supra note 14.
54. See, e.g., Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
Pennsylvania statute provides notice that "registration by a foreign corporation carries with
it consent to be sued in Pennsylvania courts"); Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162,
177 (Kan. 2006) (finding application of Kansas registration statute to require consent to
jurisdiction).
55. See generally Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the "Arise from
or Relate to" Requirement . . . What Does it Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265 (1993)
(reviewing different approaches to defining which claims "arise from or [are] related to" the
forum state); Lawrence W. Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37
IDAHO L. REV. 583 (2001) (reviewing relevant case law and scholarly input regarding
sufficient claims for specific jurisdiction); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations:
Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343 (2005) (comparing various tests
for sufficient connection to the forum state); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits
of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619 (2001) (reviewing pendent personal
jurisdiction issues in federal court).
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highlighted in the International Shoe continuum: general jurisdiction, in
which a defendant's ties to the state are so close that the defendant
should be subject to personal jurisdiction for any and all claims, and
specific jurisdiction, based on the claims against the defendant having a
"reasonable and substantial connection to the forum."5 6 They and a
number of others in the academy advocated for more than half a century
that general jurisdiction, because of its all-purpose breadth, should be
restricted to states in which the corporation is at home.57
Correspondingly, they suggested that it would be better to encourage
specific jurisdiction, with its protective requirement that the suit be
connected to the defendant's contacts with the state.5 8 Yet, in actual
practice, the states (and federal district courts within them) often applied
International Shoe as a continuum on which a corporation's substantial
and continuous "doing business" in a state would also be considered
sufficient for general jurisdiction.59
1. General Jurisdiction Before the Decision Quartet
As Justice Ginsberg recognized in Goodyear and Daimler, the
Supreme Court issued only two post-International Shoe decisions on
general jurisdiction before the decision quartet. 60 First was Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,61 decided seven years after
International Shoe. There, the Court applied "the realistic reasoning [of]
International Shoe," to hold that the Ohio courts could properly exercise
jurisdiction over a shareholder's suit claiming entitlement to dividends
and stock against a Philippines incorporated and headquartered mining
company, even though the "cause of action [did] not aris[e] out of the
corporation's activities in the state of the forum." 62 The Court based its
decision on the grounds that during World War II, when the company's
56. Genetin, supra note 7, at 113-15; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1125,
1141-44, 1147.
57. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1164-66; Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 667-69, 680.
58. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 123-24;
Genetin, supra note 7, at 114; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 274-75, 281-88 (1965); von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 14, at 1164-67; Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 203-14.
59. See Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (N.C. 1977);
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967); Cornett & Hoffheimer,
supra note 7, at 104-05.
60. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 129-31 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011).
61. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
62. Id. at 446.
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mining operations were taken over by the Japanese, "many of its wartime
activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the personal
attention of its president in that state at the time he was served with
summons [in the suit],"63 including "directors' meetings, business
correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries,
purchasing of machinery, etc."6 4 The Court concluded that the company
had engaged in Ohio in "a continuous and systematic, but limited, part
of its general business" during the war that was substantial enough to
justify all-purpose jurisdiction. 65 The Court thus allowed what was later
to be called general jurisdiction in a state that was neither the company's
state of incorporation nor principal place of business.
The second general jurisdiction case, decided literally thirty-nine
years later, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
66 was the
first Supreme Court case to apply the terms "general" and "specific"
jurisdiction. In Helicopteros, the Court held that due process precluded
the assertion of "general" jurisdiction by the state of Texas over
the defendant Colombian helicopter transport company arising out of a
fatal helicopter accident in Peru in which four non-Texas resident
plaintiff-decedents were killed while working in Peru for a Texas
consortium that had contracted for the defendant's helicopter service.
67
Although the defendant company was not licensed to do business in and
did not have any offices, real property, or employees in Texas, jurisdiction
over the Colombian corporation had been upheld by the Texas Supreme
Court based on the corporation's contacts with Texas. 68 Those contacts
consisted of its chief executive officer having gone to Texas to negotiate
the helicopter transport contract at issue (although the ultimate contract
was formalized in Peru and provided for Peruvian jurisdiction for
disputes related to the contract); the company having purchased a
significant percentage of its helicopters and parts, as well as the training
services for its pilots, from Bell Helicopter in Texas (the accident at issue
occurred in Peru, on one such Bell Helicopter); and the company having
accepted checks drawn on Texas bank accounts.6 9 The Supreme Court
held that the combination of these contacts did not rise to the level of
63. Id. at 448.
64. Id. at 445.
65. Id. at 438, 446. Dean Borchers has argued that specific jurisdiction would have been
warranted in the case because the shareholder claims in the case involved corporate
inaction during the period that its President was carrying on corporate activity in Ohio.
Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 1251.
66. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
67. Id. at 409-10, 416.
68. Id. at 417.
69. Id. at 410-11.
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"continuous and systematic general business contacts" necessary for the
assertion of "general" jurisdiction.70
What is most troubling about the Helicopteros case, however, is that
the Court declined to consider specific jurisdiction.71 As Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent, the very contract for the helicopter service at
issue was negotiated at least in part in Texas, the pilot whose alleged
negligence purportedly caused the accident was trained in Texas, and the
helicopter itself was purchased by the defendant in Texas. 72 According to
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, the parties had conceded that the
claims did not "arise out of' or "relate []to" Texas, and the Court therefore
declined to entertain whether there was specific jurisdiction.73
Thus, before the decision quartet, the clear focus of the Supreme
Court for general jurisdiction was whether there were "continuous and
systematic general business contacts,"74 not whether the company
defendant was "at home" in the state by virtue of either incorporation or
principal place of business there.7 5 Not surprisingly, many courts
continued to follow that same, more flexible "continuous and systematic
general business contacts" standard for general jurisdiction leading up to
the decision quartet,7 6 despite arguments by many in the academy
advocating for cabining general jurisdiction in favor of specific
jurisdiction.77 In fact, as some in the academy observed, the courts were
using general jurisdiction as an "imperfect safety valve" to allow for
jurisdiction in deserving cases where a rigid application of specific
jurisdiction would have denied access to the court.7 8
70. Id. at 416-17.
71. Id. at 423-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 415 (majority opinion). As we shall discuss in Part III.E., aviation accidents
involving foreign country corporations present an example of personal jurisdiction
quandaries that still exist today after the decision quartet.
74. Id. at 416.
75. See id. at 414-18 (describing the minimum contacts standard endorsed by the court
and applying this standard to the facts of the case).
76. See id. at 416; Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (N.C.
1977); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, 227 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (N.Y. 1967).
77. See Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 7, at 1245-47; Hazard, supra note 58, at 274-75,
281-88; Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra
note 14, at 203-14; Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 14; von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 14, at 1164-67.
78. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 152 n.9 (2014) ("[G]eneral jurisdiction exists
as an imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum
in cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it." (citing Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem
with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139 (2001)). Dean Borchers argued
that until courts moved to a more permissive approach for specific jurisdiction, it was
important to keep general jurisdiction in place to assure that there will always be a place
17
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2. Specific Jurisdiction Before the Decision Quartet
The Supreme Court's post-International Shoe jurisdiction decisions
applied three principal due process requirements for corporate personal
jurisdiction at the specific jurisdiction end of the International Shoe
spectrum: (1) purposeful minimum contacts, (2) that the contacts "arise
out of or relate to" the subject suit, and (3) reasonableness of the exercise
of jurisdiction.79
a. Purposeful Minimum Contacts
It became quickly settled following International Shoe that the
inquiry on the level of claim-related contacts necessary for personal
jurisdiction would be qualitative, not quantitative.80 In McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 8 1 the Supreme Court in 1957 held that an Arizona insurance
company's single purposeful contact with California, consisting of issuing
an insurance policy mailed to the California-resident policyholder there,
along with the insurer's continued receipt of premiums mailed from
there, was sufficient for California's exercise of jurisdiction over the
policyholder's suit to enforce the policy.82
Most of the Supreme Court's specific jurisdiction cases have centered
on the requirement that the defendant's contacts be "purposeful," in
order to exercise jurisdiction. The Court in Hanson v. Denckla,83 held that
due process would not permit the Florida courts to exercise specific
jurisdiction over two Delaware trust companies in a suit brought by
legatees of a Florida decedent's will challenging the passing of monies
under a trust that the decedent established in Delaware years before
moving to Florida. 84 Although the decedent had, after moving to Florida,
taken the challenged actions related to the trust, the Court found that
neither of the two defendant Delaware trust companies holding the trust
assets had engaged in any purposeful contacts with Florida connected
to sue. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 425. In
Dean Borchers's view, the problem is "at least partly about [courts too narrowly defining]
specific jurisdiction." See Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26,
at 119. Professor Twitchell made essentially the same point. Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 666.
79. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-79 (1985) (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
80. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
84. Id. at 248-51.
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with the dispute so as to make a Florida court's jurisdiction over them
fair or reasonable.8 5
Two decades later, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,86
the Court held that an Oklahoma court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over a New York car dealer and New York-based Volkswagen
distribution affiliate involved in the sale of an allegedly defective Audi
car in New York that the New York-resident plaintiff-purchasers were
driving in Oklahoma at the time of the accident at issue.87 The Supreme
Court held that the theory that it was "foreseeable" when the car was
sold by these New York companies that the car would be driven in
Oklahoma was insufficient for Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over
these companies that had no purposeful contact with Oklahoma.88 The
Court stressed that the due process personal jurisdiction analysis is
guided by both the protection of a defendant's liberty interest in not being
subjected to distant or inconvenient litigation that is unconnected to the
defendant's activity in the forum state as well as the inherent boundaries
of each state's sovereign interests within our system of federalism.89 The
Court found that the two New York companies, which sold no vehicles for
the Oklahoma market and engaged in no business there, could not
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in Oklahoma.90 By
contrast, the Court pointed out that there was no dispute that the
Volkswagen company responsible for producing the vehicle, Audi NSU
Auto Union AG, and the United States importer, Volkswagen of America,
Inc., would be subject to jurisdiction due to their purposeful systematic
efforts to serve the national market for Audi cars.9 1
Then, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,92
a more divided Court, in a 1987 plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor,
held that a Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer sued in a California
product liability personal injury action could not, consistent with due
process, implead its Japanese tire valve supplier, Asahi, into the action
because Asahi did not have sufficient purposeful contacts with California
related to the plaintiffs lawsuit.93 The sole issue to be decided in the case
involved whether one foreign manufacturer can indemnify another based
on a contract entered into regarding the shipment of valves from Japan
85. Id. at 251-53.
86. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
87. Id. at 299.
88. Id. at 295-97.
89. Id. at 292.
90. Id. at 297.
91. See id. at 288 n.3, 297.
92. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
93. Id. at 116.
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to Taiwan. 94 Justice O'Connor wrote that it was not sufficient that Asahi
sold its products into the "stream of commerce" with knowledge that they
could end up in California because it had no agents, employees,
advertising or solicitation for these products in California, nor did it
direct the products to be sold there, so as to constitute a purposeful
availment of the California forum.9 5 The plurality also factored into its
"reasonableness" analysis that California should not have a strong
sovereignty interest in such an indemnity dispute between two foreign
manufacturers since the manufacturer of the tire tube was subject to
California jurisdiction for the underlying personal injury action.96
The Supreme Court had perhaps the most difficult time in
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, a 2011 case that presented the
significant issue of how to address jurisdiction over a corporation that
targets all fifty states with sales of a product that causes injury in a state
in which the company otherwise has no contacts.9 7 The case divided the
Court 4-2-3 in the same Term that the Court unanimously decided
Goodyear, the first of the decision quartet cases. The case involved a New
Jersey plaintiff who seriously injured his hand at work while using a
metal shearing machine produced by defendant J. McIntyre, an English
company that sold its machines for resale throughout the United States
to an independent Ohio distribution company, which while not controlled
by J. McIntyre, nevertheless structured its advertising and sales efforts
whenever possible with J. McIntyre's guidance.9 8 The J. McIntyre
company also attended annual scrap recycling industry conventions in
various states (but never New Jersey) to promote its machines alongside
its United States distributor and had obtained United States patents for
its machines.99 Yet only between one and four machines, including the
one that caused the plaintiffs injury, ended up in New Jersey.100 The
New Jersey Supreme Court found personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre
on the ground that the company placed its products into the
"stream-of-commerce" and "kn[ew] or reasonably should [have known]
'that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution
94. See id. at 105-06.
95. Id. at 112-13.
96. See id. at 114-16. A concurring opinion by Justice Brennan proffered a test in which
the exercise of jurisdiction over a product producer in a product liability suit will satisfy
due process so long as the producer "is aware" when it "place[s] goods in the stream of
commerce" that the final product will be "marketed in the forum State." Id. at 117 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
97. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011).
98. Id. at 878-79.
99. Id. at 878.
100. Id.
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system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty
states."'101 The United States Supreme Court reversed, with a plurality
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy and joined in by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, holding that for a state to
exercise specific jurisdiction, a company must "purposefully avai[1] itself'
of the "benefits and protections" of the state by "target[ing]" its sales to
the forum state in some manner, and that, consistent with Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi, mere "foreseeability" that the
company's products will be sold in the state is not alone sufficient. 102
In a concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, joined in by Justice Alito,
the two Justices concurred in the judgment because the company's
contacts with New Jersey were too isolated, but noted that the continuing
advancement of the global digital market may soon call upon the Court
to recognize that former notions of requiring "target[ing]" of a forum state
will need to carry new meaning in an age when foreign producers can
easily sell goods nationally and internationally through an intermediary
such as Amazon.com.103 Justice Ginsburg dissented in an opinion joined
in by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, in which she argued that J.
McIntyre's targeting of all fifty states through its distribution system was
in essence targeting New Jersey and that its conduct was the direct cause
of injury in New Jersey. 104
The decision is a difficult pill to swallow. As the five concurring and
dissenting Justices noted, the "purposeful" contact requirement is
beginning to take on new importance as commerce moves into a global
digital age in which companies may not intend for their products to reach
any one specific state, but plainly do intend to reach all states, whether
through an intermediary distributor or the internet. Perhaps the
J. McIntyre decision can best be explained by the tiny number of the
company's products that reached New Jersey and the company's
complete lack of other contacts with the state. Surely, the result would
have been different if hundreds or thousands of the products reached
New Jersey? There are also suggestions in the plurality and concurring
opinions that the plaintiffs in the case did not create an adequate
record. 105 The J. McIntyre decision was a precipitating cause for Professor
Sachs's article proposing that Congress enact a statute to provide for
fifty-state personal jurisdiction for federal district court actions to avoid
101. Id. at 877 (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 987 A.2d 575,
591-92 (N.J. 2010)).
102. Id. at 882-86 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
103. Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 893-910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 886 (plurality opinion); id. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the seemingly unfair result that a foreign company targeting all fifty
states with its product could escape jurisdiction in the state in which the
plaintiff was injured.106 Yet Justice Breyer's concurring opinion points
out that a blanket rule providing jurisdiction over any company targeting
all fifty states through a distributor would result in a small business in
Appalachia being subject to jurisdiction in Hawaii, preferring instead an
approach that requires that the forum be "fair"in light of the defendant's
contacts with that forum.107
Presumably, Mr. Nicastro could have sued J. McIntyre in Ohio,
the distributor's principal place of business, where it is assumed that
J. McIntyre had affirmative contacts concerning United States
distribution,10 8 or in Nevada, where the machine was promoted to
plaintiffs employer by J. McIntyre and its distributor. 109 However, these
alternatives appear less appealing when it is considered that the
defendant company affirmatively targeted sales to the entire country and
the plaintiff was injured in New Jersey. 110 For that reason, this article,
in Part III.E., proposes the solution that those companies that regularly
and systematically target sales and marketing to all fifty states should,
at least in cases of bodily injury, be considered to have purposefully
targeted each state in which their product has caused the injury, subject
to a reasonableness analysis as to fairness of exercising jurisdiction in
the particular case. 11
b. 'Arising out of or Relating to"
The Supreme Court has never provided a definition of the
claim-connection requirement, derived from International Shoe, that a
106. Sachs, supra note 7, at 1302-03.
107. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 891-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 897.
111. The Supreme Court rendered another (this time non-corporate) specific jurisdiction
decision in 2014, Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288-89 (2014), which also reprised the
"purposeful availment" requirement, but this time in a much easier, unanimous decision.
A Nevada couple brought suit in the federal district court in Nevada against a Georgia
deputized Federal Drug Enforcement Administration agent at the Atlanta Hartsfield
airport for alleged wrongful search and seizing of their assets on a trip through the Atlanta
airport on their way back from Puerto Rico. The Court held that due process would not
permit the Nevada district court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant
officer because the officer had no purposeful contacts with Nevada related to the claims at
issue. Id. at 288-89. The Court rejected the argument that the officer's simply knowing that
the plaintiffs resided in Nevada and that his actions would delay the return of the seized
funds to them in Nevada constituted purposeful claim-related contacts with that state. Id.
at 289.
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case "arise out of or relate to" the defendant's contacts with the subject
state. The Supreme Court declined two specific opportunities to define
the phrase, first in Helicopteros,112 discussed above, and then again in
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute.113 As discussed in Part III.A., the phrase
appears to allow a choice of two alternative concepts, "arise out of' and
"relate to," the first of which is causal and the other denoting simply a
logical connection.114 Functionally, we know from the Court's decisions
that the phrase has been held to encompass a state where, for example,
the company's employees solicited sales leading to suit,115 where the
contract sued upon was entered into or performed,116 or where a company
has intentionally breached its discovery obligations in contesting
jurisdiction.117
c. Reasonableness
Also taken from International Shoe, the final touchstone in the
specific jurisdiction inquiry is the requirement that the exercise ofjurisdiction be "reasonable and just according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice."118 Reasonableness, in
words or substance, was part of the analysis in all of the McGee, Hanson,
World-Wide Volkswagen, Asahi, and J. McIntyre cases discussed
above.11 9 Justice White described the reasonableness requirement in
World- Wide Volkswagen as primarily focused on protecting defendants
from the burden of an inappropriate forum, but also on the interests of
the plaintiff, the state, and our federal system:
The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be
such that it is "reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend
the particular suit which is brought there." Implicit in this
emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
112. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (noting
that both parties conceded lack of specific jurisdiction).
113. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (declining to reach);
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (declining to reach).
114. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 126-27.
115. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
116. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482-87 (1985); McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
117. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707-09
(1982).
118. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
119. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903-06 (2011); Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
251-53 (1958); McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23.
23
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in
an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forum; the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.1 20
The reasonableness requirement thus acts as a fundamental fairness
check on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.121 Some of the proposals
later made in this Article regarding jurisdiction over nationwide class
actions, and addressing the J. McIntyre fifty-state targeting dilemma,
specifically incorporate the reasonableness requirement as a final test to
assure that the assertion of jurisdiction is fair and warranted under all
the circumstances. 122
II. THE GOODYEAR, DADmLER, BNSF, AND BRISTOL-MYERS QUARTET
ESTABLISH BRIGHTER LINE TESTS FOR GENERAL AND SPECIFIC
JURISDICTION
The Court's recent decision quartet transformed the International
Shoe corporate jurisdictional continuum into a strict dichotomy, which is
reflective of the post-International Shoe concepts of general and specific
jurisdiction, but which also introduced brighter-line and more restrictive
tests for personal jurisdiction over a corporation. As shown above,
although the Supreme Court and lower courts had gradually adopted the
labels of general and specific jurisdiction beginning with the 1982
Helicopteros case,1 23 the courts were otherwise continuing to apply
jurisdictional analysis along the more flexible continuum articulated in
International Shoe. Most importantly, before the decision quartet, there
was little question among practicing lawyers or academia that national
and
multi-national companies could potentially be subject to personal
120. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted).
121. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 592-94 (1991)
(employing reasonableness analysis in enforcing personal jurisdiction clause in the parties'
contract); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-87 (same).
122. See infra Parts III.B and III.E.
123. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984).
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jurisdiction (whether described as general or specific) in all states in
which they engaged in continuous and substantial business.124
A. Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF Require that a Corporation be
Essentially 'At Home" for the State to Exercise General Jurisdiction
In 2011, Justice Ginsburg authored the first of the quartet decisions
in the Court's unanimous decision in Goodyear.125 The Court held that
due process would not permit North Carolina courts to subject three
foreign-country subsidiaries of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
to "general" personal jurisdiction in a product liability case concerning an
accident in France involving a car with Goodyear brand tires
manufactured and distributed by the Goodyear European subsidiaries.126
The North Carolina courts had justified the exercise of jurisdiction based
on the companies having placed the tires in the "stream of commerce"
that would necessarily include North Carolina, even though only a tiny
percentage of tires manufactured by these subsidiaries came to be sold in
North Carolina.127 The particular tires at issue were not sold into North
Carolina, nor did the accident occur there.1 28 Goodyear thus appeared an
easy case on the facts to overturn North Carolina's assertion of general
jurisdiction over the foreign Goodyear subsidiaries, given the complete
dearth of any contacts of the subsidiaries with North Carolina.
Yet in holding that North Carolina's exercise of jurisdiction violated
due process, Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the unanimous Court took the
opportunity to recast what she termed the "canonical" decision in
International Shoe.129 Observing that jurisdictional jurisprudence
beginning with International Shoe has drawn a distinction between
corporation contacts with a state sufficient for general, all-purpose
jurisdiction, versus specific, claim-connected jurisdiction,130 Justice
Ginsburg continued that, under this dichotomy, due process demands
that general jurisdiction be exercised only in "instances in which" a
company's "continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities."131
124. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Helicopteros decision used
the broad language of "continuous and systematic general business contacts" in describing
the requirements for general jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-17.
125. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917 (2011).
126. Id. at 919-20.
127. Id. at 920.
128. Id. at 919.
129. Id. at 923.
130. Id. at 919, 923-24 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144-63).
131. Id. at 924 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
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She then quoted Professor Brilmayer in identifying the "paradigm forum"
for general jurisdiction over a corporation "[a]s . .. one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home," meaning its "place of
incorporation and principal place of business."132 Under this analysis, the
three overseas Goodyear subsidiaries were plainly not "at home" in North
Carolina so as to allow for general jurisdiction, and they had no North
Carolina contacts connected to the subject accident to allow for specific
jurisdiction. 133 Thus, despite Goodyear being such an easy case for
rejecting general jurisdiction given the foreign subsidiaries' almost
complete lack of business contacts with North Carolina, Justice
Ginsburg's opinion used the occasion to introduce the concept that the
paradigm forum for general jurisdiction over a corporation will be the
state where the company is "at home" based on its being incorporated or
operating its principal place of business there. 134 This was a
groundbreaking announcement since many state and lower federal
courts throughout the United States had been finding general corporate
personal jurisdiction based on a company's continuous and substantial
"doing business" in states that were not the corporation's so-defmed
"home."135
Then, three years later in Daimler AG v. Bauman,136 in another
opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court unanimously reversed a Ninth
Circuit decision holding that a California federal district court could
properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over the German company
Daimler AG in a suit asserting federal Alien Tort Statute and state law
claims on behalf of twenty-two Argentine residents alleging the
complicity of Daimler's Argentine subsidiary with human rights
violations by the former Argentine government. 137 The Ninth Circuit had
based its holding on the alleged substantial, continuous, and systematic
contacts with California of Daimler itself and its principal United States
subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA, LLC ("MBUSA"), a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, that owned
and operated numerous California facilities and engaged in sales in
California representing more than ten percent of all Daimler's new car
sales in the United States.138
132. Id. (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 728).
133. The United States headquartered parent company, Goodyear USA, did not contest
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 918.
134. Id. at 924.
135. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
136. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
137. Id. at 120-24, 136-42.
138. Id. at 120-22, 133-35.
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The Court's opinion in Daimler, joined in by all justices except Justice
Sotomayor (who separately concurred in the judgment), began by stating
that the Court's decision was "[i]nstructed by Goodyear,"139 which it
called a "pathmarking opinion."140 It adopted and further elaborated
Goodyear's bright-lined due process dichotomy between general and
specific jurisdiction, holding that general jurisdiction can be exercised
only when a corporation's contacts with the state "are so constant and
pervasive as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state,"141
again presenting a company's state of incorporation and principal place
of business as the "paradigm" examples.14 2 Although acknowledging that
there could be other corporate affiliations with a state that could subject
a company to general jurisdiction, the Daimler Court specifically rejected
the contention that engaging in a "substantial, continuous, and
systematic course of business" in a state alone is sufficient for general,
all-purpose jurisdiction.143 The Court accordingly concluded that
Daimler's contacts with California, even when viewed as including its
subsidiary MBUSA's very extensive California operations, were not
sufficient to make Daimler "at home" so as to subject it to general
jurisdiction.144
In both Goodyear and Daimler, Justice Ginsburg cited the Court's
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. decision,145 discussed above, as the
type of a case that would allow a finding that a corporation is at home in
a state (Ohio in Perkins) for general jurisdiction even if it is not
incorporated or does not have its principal place of business there.1 46 As
Justice Ginsburg construed Perkins, Ohio became "a surrogate" for the
139. Id. at 122.
140. Id. at 136 n.16.
141. Id. at 122 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011)).
142. Id. at 137 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 14, at 728).
143. Id. at 126 n.4, 138 n.19 (distinguishing the "continuous and systematic" contacts
held sufficient for jurisdiction in International Shoe as contacts sufficient for "specific" (not
"general") jurisdiction, noting that International Shoe arose out of the State of Washington's
claims for unemployment fund payments tied to the company's agents employed in the
state).
144. Id. at 136-39. The Court assumed for purposes of its decision that MBUSA's
contacts could be imputed to Daimler, but also specifically rejected the "agency" tests
utilized by Ninth Circuit. Id. The Court held that these tests, of whether the subsidiary is
performing in the state services that the parent company would otherwise have to perform
itself, and whether the parent company "controls" the subsidiary, could not provide a fair
basis for finding general jurisdiction because they would almost always yield affirmative
"pro jurisdiction" answers and therefore subject foreign parent corporations to generaljurisdiction whenever they have in-state subsidiaries. Id.
145. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
146. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 128-31.
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company's Philippines principal place of business because World War II
forced the company President to set up temporary shop there.
147 At
bottom, the Daimler Court cemented into place the new "essentially at
home" requirement for general jurisdiction first introduced in Goodyear:
As the Court made plain in Goodyear and repeats here, general
jurisdiction requires affiliations "so 'continuous and systematic'
as to render [the foreign corporation] essentially at home in the
forum State" . . . i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that
state. 148
Daimler thus made clear that the Court was moving to a new, simpler
dichotomy in which the concept of "doing business" in a state, even a
multi-billion-dollar "substantial, continuous and systematic course of
business" in a state,149 would no longer be part of the analysis for general
jurisdiction, applying instead the bright line, "essentially at home"
requirement. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that a company cannot fairly
be treated as "at home" in every jurisdiction in which it operates on a
substantial level, pointing out that otherwise it would make Daimler
(and thus every large multi-national corporation) subject to general,
all-purpose jurisdiction in every state. 15 0 She also noted the virtue of
simplicity and predictability of the new approach in which the paradigm
affiliations of incorporation and principal place of business "have
the virtue of being unique-that is, each ordinarily indicates only one
place-as well as easily ascertainable." 15 1
Adopting suggestions made for decades by Professors Brilmayer,
Twitchell, and others, the Daimler opinion portrays general jurisdiction
as essentially an exception to the general rule that contacts-based
assertions of long arm jurisdiction should ordinarily be confined to
situations in which specific jurisdiction can be exercised based on a forum
state connection to the claims at issue:
[G]eneral and specific jurisdiction have followed markedly
different trajectories post-International Shoe. Specific
jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer's sway, but we have
declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits
147. Id. at 128-31, 130 n.8 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1164).
148. Id. at 133 n.11 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
149. Id. at 136-38, 138 n.18.
150. Id. at 138-39.
151. Id. at 136-37.
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traditionally recognized. As this Court has increasingly trained
on the "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation," i.e., specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction has come
to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary scheme.152
In other words, rather than forming a part of the International Shoe
minimum-contacts continuum, general jurisdiction should henceforth be
viewed as centered on Pennoyer-vintage concepts of power over a
corporate defendant based on its presence and implied consent in
incorporating or operating its principal place of business in the state.
While supported by many in the academy, this was of course a large leap
from the manner in which the courts across the country had been actually
applying general jurisdiction based on a corporation's simply "doing
business" in the state on a continuous and substantial basis. 153
Three years after Daimler, the Supreme Court in BNSFRailwav Co.
v. Tyrrelll54 again applied the new bright-line dichotomy to reject the
assertion of Montana general jurisdiction over Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA") claims brought in Montana state court against the
defendant railroad company for injuries sustained outside Montana by
two non-resident employee plaintiffs.155 In another opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court held that the company's contacts with the state
consisting of two thousand miles of track and over two thousand
employees were insufficient to satisfy due process because neither of the
non-resident plaintiffs' claims arose from the company's activities in
Montana so as to allow for specific, claim-related jurisdiction, and the
defendant company was neither incorporated nor had its principal place
of business in the state so as to render the company "at home" for general
jurisdiction.156 While again noting that there may be exceptions to the
general jurisdiction paradigm of incorporation or principal place of
152. Id. at 131-33, 132 n.9 (citation omitted) ("[G]eneral jurisdiction exists as an
imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum when
specific jurisdiction would deny it." (citing Borchers, The Problem with General
Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 139)). Dean Borchers, for his part, argued that until courts
moved to a more permissive approach with specific jurisdiction, it was important to keep
general jurisdiction in place to assure that there will always be a place to sue; in his view,
the "problems are at least partly about [courts too narrowly defining] specificjurisdiction.... [and] finding a rational jurisdictional scheme that encompasses both
general and specific jurisdiction." Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra
note 26, at 119, 135. Professor Twitchell made essentially the same point. See Twitchell,
The Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 666.
153. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
154. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
155. Id. at 1553.
156. Id. at 1554, 1559.
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business in the state (again citing Perkins as an example), the Court held
that the defendant railroad company's contacts with Montana were not
nearly sufficient to render it "essentially at home" as required under the
new dichotomy.157
B. Bristol-Myers Requires that for Specific Jurisdiction, Each
Plaintiff's Claim Must Be Connected to the Corporate Defendant's
Contacts with the State
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,158 the
Supreme Court held, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Alito, that the
California Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over 592
non-resident plaintiffs in a group of eight coordinated personal injury
"mass actions" filed on behalf of 678 plaintiffs against Bristol-Myers for
injuries allegedly caused by the company's blood thinner drug Plavix.159
Justice Alito's opinion followed the same general and specific
jurisdiction dichotomy and analysis set out in Justice Ginsburg's opinions
in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF. Although it was undisputed that
Bristol-Myers maintained extensive and continuous multi-billion- dollar
operations in California, including five research laboratory facilities
employing approximately 160 employees, 250 sales representatives, and
a Sacramento advocacy office, engaged in substantial advertising in
California and booked hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales of
Plavix in the state, and presumably billions of dollars of other drug sales,
the Court held that the only two states where general jurisdiction could
157. Id. at 1558-59. The BNSF Court declined to address the plaintiffs' argument that
BNSF had consented to jurisdiction in Montana, holding that the issue had not been
addressed by the court below. Id. at 1559. There is serious question as to whether
statutorily required "doing business" registrations that had previously been interpreted to
include mandatory consent to general jurisdiction can survive the bright-line "at home"
requirement for general jurisdiction after Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF Post-Daimler
courts have generally held that such statutes cannot be interpreted to grant general
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 77-79 (Wis. 2017) (following Daimler, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that state's "doing business" registration and consent to service of process
statute will not confer general jurisdiction when corporation defendant is not "at home" in
the state); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 126 (Del. 2016) (following Daimler,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that Delaware registration and consent statute will
not confer general jurisdiction); see also Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619,
626-27 (2d Cir. 2013) (similar interpretation of Connecticut registration statute before
Daimler).
158. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
159. Id. at 1777-79, 1783.
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be obtained over the company would be its states of incorporation
(Delaware) and headquarters (New York).160
More fundamentally, the Court held that the California courts lacked
specific jurisdiction over the 592 non-residents' claims because none of
their claims bore any connection to any Bristol-Myers contacts or
activities in California.161 The Court reasoned that under International
Shoe, specific jurisdiction requires that the plaintiffs suit must actually
"aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the forum" such
that there is "an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in
the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation."1 62 It
was undisputed that the company did not manufacture, label, package,
or manage the marketing or obtaining of regulatory approval for Plavix
in California. Moreover, the non-residents did not allege that they were
injured in California or that they purchased or were prescribed their
Plavix from any California source.163
The Court rejected the "sliding scale" test for specific jurisdiction
applied by the California Supreme Court, which had provided a more
relaxed requirement of state connection to the claims at issue the greater
the defendant company's contacts with the state.164 Under this "sliding
scale," the California Supreme Court had found the indirect connection
of the 86 California resident plaintiffs and other California residents who
were or could be injured by Plavix as sufficient for specific jurisdiction
over all the 678 plaintiffs in the "mass actions," given the very
substantial Bristol-Myers contacts with the state. 165 Justice Alito's
opinion described the "sliding scale" test as "resemble[ing] a loose and
spurious form of general jurisdiction," holding that for specific
jurisdiction, an actual connection between the claims and the forum
must be shown for each plaintiff, which was missing from the 592
non-residents' claims.166
160. Id. at 1777-78, 1783.
161. Id. at 1781.
162. Id. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
163. Id. at 1781-82.
164. Id. at 1781.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1781. The Court also rejected the proposition that the wholesale distribution
of Plavix by McKesson, a California headquartered company, could establish a claim
connection for the non-residents because there was no showing that McKesson acted with
Bristol-Myers in California in a way that resulted in injury to the non-residents. Id. at 1783.
As will be discussed in Part III.F., in future cases, there will be greater incentive in
discovery to locate such claim-connections. See, e.g., Slemp v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1422-
CC09326-02, 2017 WL 9732409 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017) (denying Johnson & Johnson's
31
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
Justice Sotomayor dissented, urging that under International Shoe,
the due process test for specific jurisdiction should be based solely on the
three-part test of (1) whether the company, by its contacts or conduct,
purposefully availed itself of the privileges or benefits of the forum, (2)
whether the claims asserted "arise out of or relate to" the company's
forum conduct and (3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
"reasonable."167 In Justice Sotomayor's view, Bristol-Myers "d[id] not
dispute that it has purposefully availed itself of California's markets" in
a major way for sales of Plavix and many other drugS168 and the
undisputedly substantial contacts between Bristol-Myers and California
and its significant marketing of Plavix to California residents meant that
the state's exercise of jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers was certainly not
"unreasonable" under International Shoe.169
On a more fundamental level, Justice Sotomayor's strongly worded
dissent warned that the decision could make it more difficult to aggregate
claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little
alone, making it impossible to bring "nationwide mass actions" against
multiple defendants who are "at home" in different states, or against
foreign country defendants not headquartered or incorporated in the
United States, and thus lead to piecemeal litigation and the bifurcation
of claims. 170
III. How WILL THE GOODYEAR, DAIMLER, BNSF, AND BRISTOL-MYERS
QUARTET IMPACT COMPLEX LITIGATION AGAINST CORPORATIONS?
A. The Decision Quartet Establishes a Dichotomy with Brighter Line
Tests for General and Specific Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court's decision quartet has created, with strong
majorities, a dichotomy between general and specific jurisdiction, with
stricter, brighter-line tests for whether a state's exercise of each will
comply with due process. For the assertion of general jurisdiction, no
longer will merely engaging in continuous and very substantial business
post-verdict motion to dismiss non-Missouri plaintiffs' product liability claims seeking
recovery for ovarian cancer allegedly caused by Johnson & Johnson talcum powder, based
on Bristol-Meyers, on the ground that the plaintiffs identified in post-trial discovery that
Johnson & Johnson had purportedly sourced its talcum powder from a supplier in
Missouri).
167. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1785-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1787.
169. Id. at 1786-87.
170. Id. at 1788-89. See infra Part III.C. (discussing Justice Sotomayor's warnings in
further detail).
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within a state allow for the exercise of general jurisdiction, which now
requires that the corporate defendant be essentially "at home."171 For
specific jurisdiction, the corporation must have had purposeful contacts
with the state that are sufficiently connected to the plaintiffs claims such
that it would be fair and reasonable for the defendant to be required to
answer those claims in a court in that state.1 72 Moreover, under Bristol-
Myers, in multiple plaintiff suits, the claims of each plaintiff must satisfy
this claim-connection requirement.173
The dichotomy approach between general and specific jurisdiction
should not in and of itself be inherently problematic. The danger is that
the move to this new bright-line dichotomy will cause courts to abandon
the more flexible continuum approach that International Shoe had
introduced with its admonition that "the criteria by which we mark the
boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical
or quantitative."174
For this reason, when it comes to complex litigation, there should
be flexibility in and around the boundaries of the new Supreme
Court-defined bright lines. In the case of the general jurisdiction "at
home" requirement, for example, the Supreme Court has made clear that
there may be situations that will allow for general jurisdiction beyond
the paradigm scenarios.'17 To begin with, the Court has already found in
Perkins, as specifically approved in Daimler,176 that a state into which a
corporation temporarily moved the management of its business can
satisfy due process for general jurisdiction.1 77 One can also imagine other
scenarios that litigants may still strongly argue satisfy general
jurisdiction: (1) when a corporation announces that it will have two
headquarters or principal locations,178 (2) when a corporation's executive
headquarters is in a different state than its principal operations
171. See BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558-59 (2017).
172. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
173. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
174. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
175. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-38 (2014).
176. See, e.g., id. at 128-29.
177. Id. at 128-30; see, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
448-49 (1952).
178. Amazon has recently made an announcement of such an intention. Nick
Wingfield & Patricia Cohen, Amazon Plans Second Headquarters, Opening a
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center,17 9 or (3) when a conglomerate corporation has large, separately
managed business "groups" or "divisions," each with principal places of
business in different locations, and the lawsuit involves one such "group"
or "division" that is headquartered in the forum State. 180 Similarly, for
large multi-national corporations incorporated and headquartered in
other countries, it is proposed that "quasi-at home" general jurisdiction
should be found in the state of their United States headquarters (this
may be the state of incorporation of the company's principal United
States subsidiary) for injuries caused in the United States to residents
here, if necessary, to permit a reasonable forum for such claims.
181
Correspondingly, for specific jurisdiction, the requirement that the
claim "aris[e] out of or relat[e] to"1 82 a corporation's contacts with the
state also presents the potential for flexibility in approach. The Supreme
Court has not yet defined the phrase, 183 which originated in International
Shoe.184 As a matter of linguistic construction, it would appear that the
phrase allows a choice of two alternative concepts: "arising out of," which
is causal in nature, or "relating to," which simply denotes a logical
connection. 185 We know functionally from International Shoe and the
Supreme Court's post-International Shoe decisions discussed above that
the term requires some purposeful conduct bringing about or connected
to the claim at issue such that a defendant would have an appreciation
that its purposeful conduct could subject it to jurisdiction in the forum
179. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th
Cir. 1986) (finding that Wisconsin Knife Works had its principal place of business in
Wisconsin, but its corporate headquarters in Maryland).
180. See Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 137-38
(arguing that general jurisdiction should be applied to appropriate corporate "branches,"
but not "twigs").
181. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014). Of course, in the last two posited
categories, it is possible that plaintiffs may be able to obtain specific jurisdiction in the state
if it can be shown that the group headquarters or United States headquarters at issue was
responsible for managing the development, design, manufacture, marketing, testing
or distribution of the complained of product, service or communication. In such a case,
"quasi-at-home" general jurisdiction would not be necessary.
182. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. AT 127).
183. The Bristol-Myers Court did not define the term "arising out of or related to,"
although Justice Alito's opinion also used synonyms such as "an affiliation" or "connection"
with the claim at suit. Id. at 1781; see Daimler, 571 U.S. at 755. The Court has yet to define
the term, and specifically declined to reach the issue in both Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (deciding the case on a forum selection clause, declining to
reach issue of definition of term); and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (declining to define the term); Maloney, supra note 55, at 1266.
184. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ("[S]o far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state.").
185. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 126-29.
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for the claim in question.1SS Yet, as discussed more fully below,
commentators have differed over how narrowly or broadly they would
define the claim-connectedness requirement. Professor Brilmayer would
define the claim-contacts sufficient for specific jurisdiction narrowly to
avoid forum shopping, requiring that for corporate claim contacts pled in
a complaint to "count" toward establishing specific jurisdiction, they
must be of such a nature that they would be a substantively relevant part
of a claim even if the claim were being pled in a local suit in the company's
home jurisdiction.1 8 7 Other commentators would apply broader tests to
avoid depriving plaintiffs of a forum that is fair and reasonable to the
defendant.188 -
The Ninth Circuit and other courts in some cases have applied an
easier-to-satisfy "but for" claim connection requirement that
encompasses a broader range of corporate contacts with a state. This "but
for" test would permit a finding that the case "arises out of or relates to"
a plaintiffs claims in a state in which some corporate contact(s) occurred
"but for" which the plaintiffs alleged injury sued upon would not have
occurred.18 9 For example, if a product liability complaint alleging that a
186. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882-84 (2011);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
187. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 82-84 (1980). Professor Brilmayer argued for a narrow
test for specific jurisdiction claim-connection that would protect against allegations of
claim-connection simply made as a "hook" for personal jurisdiction in the forum but which
were not substantively connected to claim at issue. Id. at 82.
188. See, e.g., Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 637-39, 662,
680 (suggesting two part test for specific jurisdiction where (1) claim must relate in some
way to a defendant's forum activities and (2) the defendant's contacts should be the result
of seeking economic benefit in the forum such that it would be reasonable for it to anticipate
suit relating to the activities); Maloney, supra note 55, at 1282, 1294-95 (arguing for a "but
for" test on the ground that the Brilmayer "substantive connection" approach is not justified
textually and will leave reasonably deserving cases without jurisdiction); Richman, supra
note 25, at 1345-46. More recent scholarship, after some of the decision quartet cases were
decided, also suggests further flexibility in analyzing specific jurisdiction. Genetin, supra
note 7, at 109-15, 162-67 (suggesting an "interest" analysis continuum for specific
jurisdiction that weighs the connections of the case, the corporate defendant and the
plaintiffs to the state as well as the state's interest in providing a forum for the action);
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 207-08, 232-35, 247, 269 (suggesting sliding scale
approach to specific jurisdiction, with the claim connection requirement relaxed for
corporations that would meet the pre-Daimler "doing business" business standards for
general jurisdiction).
189. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (applying "but for" test to uphold Washington federal court's
jurisdiction over a Washington resident's suit against an out-of-state cruise line for
personal injury in California waters due to the cruise line's advertising in the state of
Washington that attracted the plaintiff and the plaintiffs purchase of tickets through a
Washington travel agent). The Supreme Court reversed Carnival Cruise Lines on the
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pharmaceutical drug was defective identified that significant and
case-relevant clinical trial testing used to obtain regulatory approval for
the drug occurred in a state, personal jurisdiction in the state could
arguably be based on the "but for" claim connection that the drug would
not have been sold "but for" such testing. 190 Alternatively, if tour
company tickets for a trip outside the state were advertised and sold in a
state, a resident who purchased the tickets in the state could sue the tour
company there for injuries that occurred elsewhere. 191
Some have criticized the "but for" test as being too broad since it could
arguably encompass every contact identified along an incident's
causative chain regardless of how substantially related to the injury. 192
More courts (at least before the decision quartet) have applied either a
"proximate cause" or "substantial relation" test, both of which require a
more rigorous claim-connection with the forum. 193 Yet many of the same
courts that applied these much stricter rules for specific jurisdiction
were utilizing the very broad "doing business" tests for general
ground that the parties contractually agreed to jurisdiction in the state of Florida, declining
to reach the Ninth Circuit's "but for" analysis. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585 (1991). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the "but for" test as part of a
three-part analysis with "purposeful" contact and overall "reasonableness" components as
well. Nakaki v. Caesar's Entm't. Operating Co., No. LACV12-03942 JAK (AGRx), 2012 WL
12893849, at *3-6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (upholding jurisdiction in California federal
district over defendant, Nevada hotel company, for California resident's injury at the
Nevada hotel where plaintiff alleged that she was induced to come to the hotel by the hotel's
advertising in California).
190. See, e.g., Cortina v Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. 17-CV-00247-JST, 2017 WL
2793808, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (in mass action concerning alleged injuries from
the drug Saxagliptin against defendants Bristol-Myers and AstraZeneca, the court declined
to dismiss the claims of the non-California residents under Bristol-Myers because, unlike
the case of the drug Plavix in the Supreme Court's Bristol-Myers decision, California had a
claim-connection with all the out-of-state plaintiffs based on California having been one of
the significant sites for allegedly deficient clinical trial reporting for the drug leading to
FDA approval).
191. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 at 387; Nakaki, 2012 WL 12893849, at
*3-6; Maloney, supra note 55, at 1265, 1276, 1299 (arguing in favor of the "but for"
interpretation of "arising out of or relating to").
192. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1444, 1462 (1988); Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For"
Test, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1545 (1994).
193. In Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 580-85 (Tex. 2007), the
Texas Supreme Court rejected the "but for" test as too unrestricted. It instead applied
a "substantial connection" test to reject specific jurisdiction over a resident's personal injury
suit against a Utah expedition company, despite the defendant company's extensive
in-state adverting having attracted the plaintiff, because the defendant's alleged negligent
conduct causing the injury occurred out of state. Id. In the decision, the Texas Supreme
Court catalogued the various different tests for the claim-connection requirement adopted
by many of the courts across the country. Id.
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jurisdiction-allowing for a corrective "safety valve" outlet to address
poor outcomes associated with a stingy application of specific jurisdiction
tests.194
Now that the Supreme Court has substantially limited when general
jurisdiction can be exercised, and thus removed a large portion of this
"safety valve," it is especially important that courts be vigilant in not
blindly applying overly restrictive tests for specific jurisdiction that
would deprive plaintiffs of access to a reasonable forum.1 95 In Part III.E,
infra, this Article proposes that courts be prepared to apply the
somewhat more flexible "quasi-at home" general jurisdiction and "but
for" specific jurisdiction approaches, as necessary, to address cases in
which deserving plaintiffs would otherwise face deprivation of a
reasonable forum.
B. The Decision Quartet Should Not Adversely Impact Personal
Jurisdiction for Class Actions
Justice Sotomayor in her Bristol-Myers dissent asked the important
question of whether nationwide class actions may be at risk as a result
of the decision quartet,19 6 on the ground that corporate defendants will
now argue that specific jurisdiction in class actions will require a
purposeful connection between a defendant corporation's contacts with
the state and the injuries to each of the absent putative class members. 197
After all, the Court in Bristol-Myers dismissed the cases of all of the 592
non-California resident plaintiffs in consolidated mass tort actions on the
ground that none of these non-residents' claims had any connection with
the forum state of California, despite there being 86 California-resident
plaintiffs in the case whose claims did arise out of their drug purchase
and injury in the state.198 As Justice Sotomayor noted, the issue is an
important one, particularly for small value class claims over nationwide
misconduct.199
For the reasons that follow, it is posited that while there may be short
term disruption in current nationwide and multi-state class actions
194. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 131;
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 232-34; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132
n.9 (2014) (general jurisdiction is "an imperfect safety valve that sometimes allows
plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would deny it."(quoting Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 139)).
195. See infra Part III.E.
196. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 n.4(2017).
197. Id. at 1789.
198. Id. at 1781.
199. Id. at 1784, 1789 n.4.
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arising from the litigation over the application of Bristol-Myers to class
actions, there should be little reason for significant concern over the
survival of class actions addressing alleged nationwide corporate
misconduct, no matter how the decision quartet is construed in
application to class actions. Nevertheless, it is important to review the
options for class actions because there is no doubt that personal
jurisdiction defenses will be, and are being, increasingly asserted in class
actions following Bristol-Myers and the other quartet decisions.
200
To begin with, there are at least three options over the long term that
will support personal jurisdiction over a nationwide or multi-state
plaintiff class action against one or more defendants even under the
strictest reading of the decision quartet:
1) The easiest option, and the one encouraged by the decision
quartet, will be to obtain specific jurisdiction for the entire
multi-state or nationwide class in a state in which the defendant
company has designed, produced, tested, or from which it has
shipped, the product or packaging, or the state from which
the defendant planned, authored, or disseminated the
communication that is the subject of the class claims. 201 For a
consumer contract case, it could be the corporation's place of
contracting. 202
2) Another option for personal jurisdiction consists of suits in
either the "at home" state of incorporation or the principal place
of business of the corporate defendant.203 This approach could
add additional states to the specific jurisdiction states as options.
Of course, as noted by Justice Sotomayor in her Bristol-Myers
dissent, if there is more than one defendant with different states
of incorporation or principal places of business, the issue can
200. See, e.g., cases collected infra notes 216-17; see also Michael Leffel & Aaron
Wegryzn, Jurisdiction Issues Dog Multistate Class Actions, LAW360 (March 2, 2018,
12:09 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1017610/Jurisdiction-issues-dog-multistate-
class-actions; Adam Pollet, Amber Unwala & Jessica Rodgers,
Bristol-Myers Squibb: 1 Year Later, LAW360 (June 18, 2018, 3:14 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1054768/bristol-myers-squibb- 1-year-later; Neil Tyler &
Claudia Vetesi, Bristol-Myers Squibb: A Dangerous Sword, LAW360 (April 25, 2018, 2:11
PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1037204/bristol-myers-squibb-a-dangerous-sword.
201. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 921, 923
(2011).
202. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985) (company
headquarters); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (policyholder's state).
203. See BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1552-53 (2017); Bristol-Myers,
137 S. Ct. at 1780; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at
924.
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become more complicated, but there should often be overlap in at
least one state among the potential specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction states.204 For multiple corporate defendants
who have allegedly conspired or engaged in alleged wrongdoing
together, there are also the states where it can be shown that
they engaged together in alleged actions upon which the claims
are based.
3) For federal securities, 205 antitruSt,206 ERISA,207 and certain
other important federal claims, 208 there is nationwide personal
jurisdiction available in the federal district courts via nationwide
service of process statutes and, therefore, nationwide class
actions are potentially available for these significant claim
areas.209 The federal district court will also have supplemental
subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims joined in such
an action.210 Indeed, one unintended result of the decision quartet
may be to encourage plaintiffs' counsel to search for such federal
claims that provide nationwide jurisdiction alongside state law
claims.
Aside from these options, there is also the more fundamental option
for plaintiffs' class counsel to argue that in a nationwide or multi-state
class action context, only the named plaintiffs, not the absent class
members, should be considered as plaintiff-parties for purposes of
determining the court's jurisdiction over defendants in a class action.
Under this approach, the absent class members would not be considered
204. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784-89 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In addition, as
noted above, there will be cases to be made for reasoned incremental expansion of the "at
home" definition to address, for example, companies with two or more principal places of
business or a foreign company with a single, large United States headquarters and
principal base of operations that it could be argued should be treated as its "at home"
jurisdiction for suits in the United States relating to United States claims.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012).
207. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012).
208. See Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2012);
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9613(e) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d); Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(2012); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (allowing for service in accordance with federal statutes
under which cases are brought).
209. See generally Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783 (leaving open the question of whether
the Fifth Amendment due process limitations on federal jurisdiction are different than the
Fourteenth Amendment limitations for states); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits
on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 62-85
(1984).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
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plaintiffs for the Bristol-Myers claim-connection analysis. 211 The
Supreme Court has previously held that absent class members may be
deemed parties only for some purposes, and not for others.212 For
example, on the question of determining traditional diversity subject
matter jurisdiction in a class action under 28 USC § 1332(a), the Court
will only look to the citizenship of the named plaintiffs, not to the absent
class members. 213 There is logic as well to the distinction between: (a) the
hundreds of non-resident plaintiffs joined in a single mass tort personal
injury action in a Bristol-Myers-type case, in which the defendant must
investigate, discover, and litigate each joined plaintiffs claim on issues
like causation, individual physician's advice, potential misuse, and
damages; and (b) a certified class action in which predominant common
legal and factual issues are, by definition, mostly focused on the
defendant and are presented by the named representative plaintiffs with
virtually no participation by, or discovery needed from, out-of-state
absent class members. In the Bristol-Myers-type "mass action," there is
a much greater litigation burden on a defendant haled into a jurisdiction
to face hundreds of full-fledged individual claims that do not bear any
contacts with that jurisdiction. 214 In the class action, by contrast, the
class should not even be certified unless the issues are found to be so
common that they can be effectively and fairly litigated solely by the class
representative plaintiffs, which provides another protection to
defendants in such cases. 21 5
Several post-Bristol-Myers federal district court decisions have
confined the specific jurisdiction analysis in class actions to the named
plaintiffs on essentially these grounds,216 while others have applied
211. See infra note 217.
212. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Devlin v.
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7-11 (2002) (finding that absent class members who object to a
settlement have standing to appeal without formal intervention as party).
213. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1921). This case
discusses how only named plaintiffs must meet the traditional complete diversity
requirement, not absent plaintiff class members. Id.
214. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1776.
215. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807-10 (1985).
216. See Molock v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2018)
(allowing jurisdiction over class claims asserted on behalf of non-resident absent class
members based on the claims of the named plaintiffs having arisen in the District of
Columbia forum State, noting the protections to the defendant accorded by the class
certification requirements); Braver v. Northstar Alarm Services, LLC, No. 17-0383, 2018
WL 6929590, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2018) ("This court joins the majority of other courts
in holding that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions in federal court"); In re Morning
Song Bird Food Litig, No. 12CV01592 JAH-AGS, 2018 WL 1382746, at *5 (S.D. Cal. March
19, 2018) (finding Bristol-Myers is not applicable to claims of unnamed class members
in a class action); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
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Bristol-Myers to dismiss class action claims on behalf of out-of-state
residents, principally on the grounds that the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b), prohibits Federal Rule 23 from being applied to abridge
substantive rights such as a defendant's due process right not to be
subject to jurisdiction in a state for any non-resident claims (whether as
a party or absent class member) that do not satisfy the tests of either
general or specific jurisdiction in the state.217
(dismissing claims of non-resident named plaintiff but declining to dismiss Illinois-resident
named plaintiffs asserting nationwide class claims in a putative class action); In re
Chinese-Manufactured DryWall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *14
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017) (upholding jurisdiction over Chinese manufacturers and
distributors for four nationwide class actions centralized in an MDL proceeding from their
original federal transferor districts in Louisiana, Florida, and Virginia, distinguishing
Bristol-Myers as a "mass tort action[]" of joined individual claims that mostly had no contact
with California in contrast to the Chinese Dry Wall defendants' claim-contacts with each
state and emphasizing that the resident named plaintiffs' claims in the Chinese Dry Wall
case had been certified as cohesive under the Rule 23 tests of commonality, typicality,
adequacy of representation, predominance, and superiority); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr.
Pepper Snapple Grp., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22,
2017) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over out-of-state class members in
a nationwide class action because only the named plaintiffs' claims should be considered
for personal jurisdiction). Still other courts have deferred the decision on the personaljurisdiction defense until the time of deciding class certification, an approach that would
allow the Court to confirm the truly common and cohesive nature of the proposed
named plaintiffs' representative action. See, e.g., Broomfield v. Craft Brew All., Inc., No.
17-cv-01027-BLF, 2017 WL 3838453, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017) (deferringjurisdictional motion to dismiss nationwide class based on Bristol-Myers until the class
certification motions are presented, noting that nationwide class may not be able to be
certified without class representatives from each state in a putative class action for alleged
misleading labeling of beer).
217. See Leppert v. Champion Petfoods USA, Inc., No. 18 C 4347, 2019 WL 216616, at
*4 (N.D. fll. Jan. 16, 2019) (the Bristol-Myers requirement that each plaintiff must have a
claim-connection with the state applies to class actions because "a defendant's due process
rights should remain constant regardless of the suit against him, be it an individual, mass,
or class action."); Practice Mgmt. Support Servs. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d
840, 860-62 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (certifying statewide-only class, applying Bristol-Myers to limit
the class to in-state residents of Illinois on the grounds that Federal Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012), prohibits Rule 23 from abridging a defendant's substantive
rights, including the right not to be subject to claims of non-residents over which the
court has no specific jurisdiction); Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874 ("Nothing
in Bristol-Myers suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs in a putative class
action; rather, the Court announced a general principle-that due process requires a
'connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue."' (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137
S. Ct. at 1781)); McDonnell v. Nature's Way Prods. LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 Wl 4864910,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins., No. CV-17-00165-PHX-
DLR, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017) ("The Court also notes that it lacks
personal jurisdiction over the claims of putative class members with no connection to
Arizona and therefore would not be able to certify a nationwide class."); DeBernardis v.
NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018) (dismissing out-
of-state portions of proposed classes, expressing the court's belief "that it is more likely than
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The Supreme Court's groundbreaking 1985 class action decision in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 218 in which the Court first upheld the
very concept of a state court adjudicating a nationwide class action, also
provides some support for analyzing jurisdiction in class actions by
reference to the named plaintiffs rather than absent class members, even
though the Supreme Court's Bristol-Myers decision declined to find the
case persuasive with respect to the non-class mass tort plaintiffs at issue
in that case. 219 In Shutts, Phillips Petroleum, a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Oklahoma, was sued in a Kansas state court class
action seeking recovery of unpaid interest on certain delayed gas lease
royalty payments.220 The class action was brought on behalf of a class of
lease investors in all fifty states and some foreign countries by three
named plaintiffs: Irl Shutts, a Kansas resident, and Robert and Betty
Anderson, residents of Oklahoma. 221 Although Kansas had only limited
contacts with the dispute (99% of the leases and 97% of the investor class
members were out-of-state), Phillips did not even contest personal
jurisdiction. 222 Rather, Phillips raised Constitutional due process
objections to the Kansas court's (1) assertion of nationwide jurisdiction
over the absent nationwide (and foreign country) plaintiff class members
with which it did not have minimum contacts or consent and (2)
determination to apply Kansas substantive law to all claims.
223
The Supreme Court's two holdings went on to influence how class
actions, particularly state court class actions, were to be litigated to this
day. On the subject of whether the Kansas state court could adjudicate a
nationwide class action without first obtaining jurisdiction over absent
not . . . that the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to outlaw nationwide class actions
in a form [sic], such as in this case, where there is no general jurisdiction over the
Defendants").
218. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The case was argued by two prominent Supreme Court
litigators, Arthur R. Miller and Joel L. Klein. Id. at 798. For two prominent early reviews of
this groundbreaking case, see John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of
Frankenstein: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 U.
KAN. L. REV. 255 (1985); Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986).
219. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781-82.
220. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
221. Id. at 799-801.
222. Id. at 804-05, 815; see Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions,
62 IND. L.J. 597, 616 (1987). One might ask why Phillips did not contest jurisdiction in the
case, but the reason was most probably because lawyers at the time commonly believed that
general jurisdiction arose from a company's continuous and extensive "doing business" in a
state, which Phillips no doubt did in Kansas, and the fact that Kansas, like most states,
had a foreign "doing business" registration and consent to service of process statute that
was assumed to confer jurisdiction on companies registered to do business there.
223. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806, 815-16.
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out-of-state class members, the Court, in a 7-1 opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, held that due process did not require the same type of
"minimum contacts" protections with respect to the absent plaintiff class
members as with respect to a named defendant.224 The Court reasoned
that the absent plaintiff class members are not burdened in the litigation
in the same way as a defendant: they are not haled into court, do not need
to fear damages or other penalty, and, most significantly, they are, at
least in a money damages action, given actual notice and the right to opt
out of the class, and they have the benefit of court approval with an
opportunity to be heard for any proposed settlement. 225 Moreover, the
Court noted, absent class members are protected by the representative
nature of the class action in which the class certification process insures
that the named plaintiffs' claims are common with those of absent class
members and that the named plaintiffs will adequately represent
them. 226
On the subject of whether a Kansas state court could apply Kansas's
own substantive law to all claims, the Supreme Court agreed with
Phillips that due process and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution would not allow the application of a forum state's
substantive law to out-of-state lease investors' claims if the state did not
"have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts"
applicable to each class member for which the law would be applied or,
at a minimum, a lack of conflict with the laws of out-of-state class
members' states. 227 The Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court
of Kansas to address this choice of law issue.228 This holding in Shutts
has led to some well-known decisions in the federal circuit courts
reversing class certifications in nationwide class actions when, in
addition to other problems, numerous conflicts among potentially
applicable state laws were held to preclude a finding of predominance of
common issues under Federal Rule 23(b)(3).229 Thus, wholly aside from
Shutts's application to the class action personal jurisdiction question, the
choice of law prong of the Shutts decision acts as a constraint on
224. Id. at 811-12.
225. Id. at 809-10.
226. Id. at 808-14.
227. Id. at 816-18 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
228. Id. at 816, 823.
229. See, e.g., id. at 818-23 (1985); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
741-43 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (7th Cir.
2002). Some courts have upheld multi-state class certifications when different state laws
were applied via different plaintiff sub-classes within a single class action. See, e.g., Pella
Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
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nationwide class actions that could involve multiple different state
laws. 230
Although Justice Alito's opinion for the Court in Bristol-Myers
rejected the plaintiffs' citation of Shutts as a basis for allowing California
jurisdiction with respect to the 592 individual non-resident plaintiffs'
claims in the mass tort action presented in Bristol-Myers, on the principal
ground that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was never
considered by the Court in Shutts, 231 there is a strong argument for the
applicability of the Shutts reasoning to absent class members in the
context of a multi-state class action against a defendant. Shutts can be
read to support the proposition that, generally, only the named plaintiffs
claims should be considered in the jurisdictional analysis because the
absent class members are not parties to the same degree and are being
represented by the named plaintiffs through a rigorous class certification
procedure 232 intended to ensure commonality of claims, adequacy and
typicality of representation of the class members, and in the case of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, preponderance of common issues and superiority
of the class action to adjudicate the issues presented.233 Moreover, as
discussed above, absent class members do not present a defendant with
the same litigation burdens as individual plaintiffs in terms of discovery
or case participation; rather, their claims are represented by the named
plaintiffs.
Shortly after Shutts was decided three decades ago, one prominent
commentator (then Professor, now Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Diane P.
Wood) suggested a similar construct for analysis of class action personal
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant.234 To begin with, she suggested,
like others in the academy, that "general jurisdiction" should be limited
to the one or two states that would be considered the company's "home"
to protect against "forum shopping." 235 She also noted that for many class
actions, the most logical states for specific jurisdiction would often be, by
definition, states where all class members had a claim connection.236 She
then proposed that for what she termed "purely representational" Rule
230. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-23.
231. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1782-83
(2017).
232. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808-09.
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) & (b)(3); see, e.g., Sanchez v. Launch Tech.
Workforce Solutions LLC, 297 F. Supp.3d 1360, 1365-66 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (holding that only
the named class plaintiffs, not absent class members, should be considered for the court's
specific personal jurisdiction analysis (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811)).
234. See generally Wood, supra note 222, at 597.
235. Id. at 614-15.
236. Id. at 617.
44
2018] A NEW GUARD AT THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 45
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions and "small-stakes" Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions, a court's analysis of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
should generally focus only on the representative named plaintiffs'
claims, not on the absent class members. 237 By contrast, she proposed
that for what she termed "joinder" class actions, where there are larger
individual monetary claims and less clear cohesion, the jurisdictional
analysis could need to focus on each plaintiff class member.238
This Article proposes a presumption, not a hard and fast rule, in favor
of class action specific jurisdiction being based on solely the named
plaintiffs' claim-connections to the forum state. If there are cases in
which a defendant can demonstrate that the forum state has insufficient
claim-connection with absent class members, then there could be a due
process "reasonableness" defense asserted that could be tested by the
actual facts of the case. After all, plaintiff class counsel should not, as a
matter of "fair play and substantial justice," be able to choose a state with
which the defendant has had only the most minimal contacts to file a
nationwide class action based on only a few in-state named plaintiffs and
little else to tie the defendant to the state. Of course, for a nationwide
class action, any one state generally will not have a huge percentage of
class members versus the entire remainder of the country, but what could
be shown to be unreasonable is for the forum state to have an
insignificant number of absent class members. Due process requires that
the defendant's contacts must reasonably support the exercise ofjurisdiction, taking into account the burdens on the defendant.239
Most importantly, looking forward, if plaintiffs class counsel are
mindful in their forum selection process, the issue of non-resident absent
class members should not present significant jurisdictional issues. The
issue will not arise at all in cases that are brought in states where there
is general jurisdiction over the defendant(s) because, by definition, the
defendant corporation will be subject to jurisdiction for all purposes in a
state in which it is subject to general jurisdiction.240 Moreover, if
plaintiffs' counsel selects a strong specific jurisdiction state for filing the
class action-such as where the subject product or communication was
designed, produced, or from which it was purposely distributed, for
example-the forum selection will necessarily ensure that the
defendant's contacts with the state will be connected to the claims of
237. Id. at 615-18.
238. Id.
239. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780(2017) ("Mhe 'primary concern' is 'the burden on the defendant."' (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
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every injured absent class member nationally, also solving any potential
Bristol-Myers issue completely. 241 For these reasons, the issue of
non-resident absent class members should more often come up in the
transitional period, just after Bristol-Myers and the other quartet
decisions, when there are still already pending class actions that were
brought before Bristol-Myers and the other decision quartet cases
established the new dichotomy approach to personal jurisdiction.
Indeed, there are other protections to prevent plaintiff class counsel
from pursuing nationwide or multistate class actions in which absent
class members' claims bear no real connection to the forum state. First,
Shutts makes clear, as later reinforced by subsequent circuit decisions,
that due process will prevent application of the forum state's law to a
multi-state class action if the class members do not have appropriate
connections to the state and there are meaningful differences in the
potentially applicable other states' laws. 242 Plaintiffs' counsel who
attempt to squeeze too many different state laws into one class action
risk losing the all-important class certification motion on the ground of
lack of predominance of common issues.243 Bringing a nationwide or
multistate class action with different state law subclasses might be one
option to attempt to address this issue.244 However, there is also the
simple option of class counsel bringing state-wide-only class actions with
only state resident plaintiffs. Any such actions could, in most cases, be
filed or removed with minimal diversity in the appropriate federal
district court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1353.245 Most importantly, if there are multiple such
state-wide class actions filed or removed to the federal district courts in
different states, as will often be the case if plaintiffs' counsel wishes to
cover the entire country or there are competing cases filed in or removed
241. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 U.S. at 1773.
242. See Phillips Petroleum Co., v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-23 (1985); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2002); Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir. 1996).
243. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-23; In re Bridgestone[Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d at
1018-19 (class certification denied because of, inter alia, choice of law differences among
nationwide class members); Castano, 84 F.3d at 741-43 (same).
244. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 392-93 (7th Cir. 2010).
245. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (2012); Class Action Fairness Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). The proposed class will need to satisfy the overall $5
million amount in controversy requirement and not be subject to the local action exceptions.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)-(d)(4) (2015). Traditional diversity jurisdiction is also available
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) if there is complete diversity of citizenship of all defendants from
the named class plaintiffs and the $75,000 amount in controversy can be met by the named
plaintiffs. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 579 (2005);
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921).
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to federal district courts in different states by different counsel, then
MDL centralization of the cases for pre-trial purposes under 28 U.S.C. §
1407 can be sought from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
("JPMDL"). As discussed further in Part III.D. infra, once centralized by
the JPMDL, these cases can be coordinated together for class
certification, summary judgment motions and all other motion practice
short of trial, and can also be settled on a class basis in, and with the
assistance of, the MDL transferee court.246
When the Class Action Fairness Act was passed in 2005, Professor
Carol Andrews asked why this federal class action reform effort did not
specifically address the personal jurisdiction problems in nationwide
class actions, and proposed that a federal statute or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction for certain
defined categories class actions as one solution.247 Bristol-Myers
explicitly left open the issue of whether Fifth Amendment jurisdictional
due process analysis would be different for a federal court than
Fourteenth Amendment jurisdictional due process analysis,248 but there
would seem to be little doubt that as a matter of pure constitutional law,
Congress could enact a statute or approve a new federal rule that would
allow a federal court to exercise nationwide jurisdiction for multi-state
Class Action Fairness Act cases consistent with the country's
sovereignty.249
The decision quartet is bringing about heightened examination by
defendants of class actions to ensure that the defendant(s) have been
sued either "at home" or that there is a specific jurisdiction connection
between the defendant's conduct and the forum state with respect to
every plaintiffs claims.250 If the courts and the Supreme Court do adopt
a personal jurisdiction analysis in class actions that presumptively looks
only to the plaintiff class representatives for specific jurisdiction
analysis, as proposed in this Article, this should further underscore the
important gate keeping function of the class certification motion to
246. See generally John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008).
247. Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National
Debate About "Class Action Fairness," 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1383 (2005).
248. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783-84
(2017).
249. See generally Andrews, supra note 247; Sachs, supra note 7, at 1346-50. There are
federal nationwide jurisdiction statutes for certain very important and often asserted
claims such as those under the securities laws, antitrust laws, bankruptcy laws, Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Federal
Interpleader Act. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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ensure that any proposed class is cohesive enough in terms of
commonality, adequacy of representation, typicality of claims, and
predominance of common issues to warrant class certification. If the
courts go in the other direction, and instead require that each and every
absent class member's claim "arise out of or relate to" the defendant's
contacts with the state to support specific jurisdiction, then, as discussed
above, plaintiffs will nevertheless still be able to support jurisdiction over
a corporate defendant for a nationwide or multi-state class action in any
"at home" state or strong specific jurisdiction state where the defendant's
conduct giving rise to the action occurred.
C. Jurisdiction for "Mass Actions" Will Now Require that the
Corporate Defendant is Either Essentially 'At Home" or that its
Contacts with the State Are Connected to Each Plaintiffs Claim
Mass torts often lead to large, complex cases in which numerous
plaintiffs are joined, under traditional joinder rules, in what are often
termed "mass actions." In these cases, the predominance of individual
issues and the large stakes of the joined individuals' claims renders the
class action device unavailable. This is the purest form of "joinder" action
posited by Chief Judge Wood in her 1987 article, in which she contended
that personal jurisdiction should be separately analyzed for each
plaintiff.2 51 Mass action complaints will often follow publicity about an
alleged injury-causing product defect, mass accident, or other similar
scenario in which a large number of injuries have occurred. 252
Prior to Bristol-Myers, it was common in product liability or other
mass injury scenarios for experienced plaintiff counsel to attract
plaintiffs on a multi-state or nationwide basis and then bring suit with
all such plaintiffs in a state or federal court in a chosen state. Some would
attribute this activity to plaintiffs' counsel "forum shopping" for a
favorable "magnet" jurisdiction where it is hoped to obtain more
favorable results. 253 Others would attribute the phenomenon simply to
cases being referred by counsel across the country to particularly
experienced lawyers in given states.254 Whatever the motivation, as
251. Wood, supra note 222, at 601-05.
252. Heyburn, supra note 246, at 2229-30; see In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012);
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2010); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360
F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2005).
253. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 222, at 612, 612 n.39, 614-16.
254. Interestingly, while the Bristol-Meyers mass actions were pending in California,
many other Plavix product liability cases were contemporaneously filed in or removed to
federal courts across the country and centralized as an MDL proceeding in the District of
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a result of the decision quartet, plaintiffs' counsel seeking to bring a
multi-state or nationwide mass tort lawsuit on behalf of both residents
and non-residents of the forum state will now need to bring the case in
either an "at home" jurisdiction of the defendant(s) under Goodyear,
Daimler, and BNSF, or in a state in which the specific contacts of the
defendant are connected to the claims of each of the plaintiffs as required
in Bristol-Myers. While that might sound daunting, and will likely cause
some dislocation in already pending pre-Bristol-Myers mass actions, the
truth is that it should not be a difficult task in most future cases to locate
such a state. In addition to the defendants' "at home" states, there are
the "strong" specific jurisdiction states, such as where the mass accident
occurred, or where the allegedly defective product or misleading
statement was designed, produced, tested, or from which is was
distributed or disseminated.
But what should no longer occur is the filing of non-residents' claims
in a state in which their claims have no meaningful relation. In fact,
shortly following the Bristol-Myers decision, a number of trial courts
granted dismissals of product liability mass tort cases brought on behalf
of non-residents. 255
Moreover, plaintiffs will often have the option of filing "mass actions"
of one hundred or more plaintiffs against a minimally diverse defendant
or defendants in the federal district court under the Class Action
Fairness Act,256 or filing actions with fewer plaintiffs under traditional
diversity jurisdiction.257 If there are any federal claims, an action can also
New Jersey by the JPMDL. In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
I), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2013). The non-residents plaintiffs could simply
have brought suit in their home states or in any of the various other states with specific or
general jurisdiction and joined the MDL proceeding. They probably still can if they bring
suit in a state with a savings statute to toll the statute of limitations for their claims. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8-34 (1957); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-217 (2018); IOWA CODE § 614.10
(2009). These statutes, with some differences between them from state-to-state, toll the
statute of limitations when a claim is filed within the statute of limitations period and there
is a pre-merits dismissal of the case after the statute of limitations would otherwise have
run.
255. See, e.g., Siegfried v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 4:16 CV 1942 CDP,
2017 WL 2778107, at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2017) (dismissing claims of eighty-six non-
resident plaintiffs, leaving only a handful of Missouri-resident plaintiffs); Jordan v. Bayer
Corp., 4:17-CV-865 (CEJ), 2017 WL 3006993, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2017) (dismissing
all but seven Missouri plaintiffs and one an Illinois plaintiff, in a case with ninety-four
total plaintiffs under Bristol-Myers). But see Slemp v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1422-
CC09326-02, 2017 WL 9732409 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017) (in which the plaintiffs, after
Bristol-Myers was decided, developed discovery to tie the subject talcum powder to the state
of Missouri, thus saving the out-of-state plaintiffs' claims).
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2012).
257. Id. § 1332(a)(3).
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be filed in the federal district court under federal question jurisdiction. 258
All such similar federally filed or removed cases brought in different
states can be centralized in a single MDL proceeding pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407. Moreover, there is a growing history of, and precedent for,
coordination of virtually all significant pre-trial practice between federal
MDL courts and state courts with similar cases. 259
The key point is that for most cases, there is little reason to believe
that there are not plenty of options open for the filing and economically
efficient prosecution of mass tort claims following the decision quartet.
D. MDLs and Federal-State Judicial Cooperation Will Continue to
Provide an Avenue for Nationwide Coordination
As noted above, the MDL process will continue to provide an
important vehicle for the nationwide centralization of similar class
actions, mass actions, and other litigation brought in or removed to the
federal district courts located in different states arising out of common
alleged wrongful corporate conduct or a common accident or disaster.
MDL centralization has been utilized for mass tort,260 business fraud,261
consumer fraud,262 environmental,263 securitieS, 264 antitruSt,265 and many
other claims involving similar actions pending in different districts. 266
258. Id. § 1331.
259. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (J.P.M.L. 2005);
In re New York Renu with Moistureloc Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1785, CA 2:06-MN-
77777-DCN, 2008 WL 2338552, at *2 (D.S.C. May 8, 2008) (memorandum opinion and order
regarding documents asserted to be protected by attorney-client privilege or as work
product).
260. See, e.g., In re Vioxx, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.
261. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 252 F.R.D. 83, 85-86
(D. Mass. 2008) (regarding claims of grossly inflated prices of drugs in industry
publications); In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., Nos. MDL-1334, MDL- 1364, MDL-
1367, MDL-1366, 2000 WL 1925080 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 23, 2000) (seeking centralization of all
claims against managed care companies); In re Humana, Inc. Managed Care Litig., No.
1334, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5099, at *2 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 13, 2000) (regarding claim that
physician financial incentives violate several federal statutes).
262. See In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (regarding sales of vehicles with engines that emitted
nitrous oxide in excess of legal limits despite official testing).
263. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795-96 (5th Cir. 2014) (regarding
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill).
264. See, e.g., In re Initial Public Offering (IPO) Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (regarding claim of misrepresentations to manipulate the price of issuers'
securities).
265. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L.
2006) (regarding claims of conspiracy to eliminate competition and price-fixing).
266. Heyburn, supra note 246, at 2229-30.
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Once an MDL proceeding has been established by the Judicial Panel
on Multi-District Litigation, there will typically be later-filed "tag-along"
cases that are either transferred to the district court presiding over the
MDL proceeding as additional MDL cases or directly filed in the MDL
district court.267 Often the MDL judge will ask that the parties consent
to the direct filing of such additional tag-along actions directly in the
MDL district or at least to accept service of process for such cases. 268
However, if the case is not a federal statutory case with nationwide
personal jurisdiction, there must be grounds for personal jurisdiction
over the defendant(s) in the MDL district in order for the MDL transferee
court to adjudicate the case other than for pre-trial purposes unless the
defendant(s) consent to jurisdiction.269 Defendants will likely be more
vigilant following the decision quartet not to waive any personal
jurisdiction defense in consenting to MDL "direct filings" of tag-along
cases in an MDL proceeding. 270 Nevertheless, the value of the MDL in
helping to resolve all pre-trial matters and often bringing about full
settlement cannot be overstated.27 1
As also noted above, when similar such cases remain in both state
and federal courts, there has also now been at least two decades of
experience with ad hoc coordination of such cases, with the state and
federal judges agreeing to coordinate discovery and motion schedules,
hear nearly identical motions in each other's courtrooms together and
work together to organize bellwether trials and other efforts toward a
settlement of all or as many of the cases as possible.272 In fact, the JPMDL
website has a link dedicated to "Federal and State Coordination," which
is described on the website as "[a] joint project by the National Center for
267. JPML Rule 7.2 (a), titled "Potential Tag-alongs in Transferee Court", provides that
"[plotential tag-along actions filed in the transferee district do not require Panel action. A
party should request assignment of such actions to the Section 1407 transferee judge in
accordance with applicable local rules." J.P.M.L.R. 7.2 (a).
268. See James Beck, No Basis for Personal Jurisdiction in.MDL Direct Filing, LAW360
(Oct. 31, 2017, 12:48 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/9793 11/no-basis-for-personal-
jurisdiction-in-mdl-direct-filing.
269. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 37-40 (1998).
270. Beck, supra note 268.
271. See generally UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2016),
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML Calendar Year-Statistics-2016.pdf
(calendar year statistics January through December 2016); Eldon E. Fallon, Common
Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371 (2014) (discussing the fee
structure for compensating lead attorneys in an effort to not discourage settlement).
272. See generally In re New York Renu with Moistureloc Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
1785, 2008 WL 2338552 (D.S.C. May 8, 2008); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp.
2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005).
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State Courts . .. and the Federal Judicial Center." 273 One very prominent
example consisted of the federal and state coordination efforts and
settlement in the Vioxx pharmaceutical cases that were pending in both
a federal MDL proceeding in the Eastern District of Louisiana and in a
number of state courts, principally in New Jersey and California.
274 But
there are numerous other examples as well.27
5
E. Concerns Over Whether There Will Be Instances Where No State
Can Offer Jurisdiction for a Nationwide Mass Action after the
Decision Quartet
Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Bristol-Myers raises a number of
concerns about the ability to bring nationwide mass action cases in a
single state:
After this case, it is difficult to imagine where it might be possible
to bring a nationwide mass action against two or more defendants
headquartered and incorporated in different States. There will be
no State where both defendants are "at home," and so no State in
which the suit can proceed. What about a nationwide mass action
brought against a defendant not headquartered or incorporated
in the United States? . . . Especially in a world in which
defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in only a handful of
States, the effect of today's opinion will be to curtail-and in some
cases eliminate-plaintiffs' ability to hold corporations fully
accountable for their nationwide conduct.276
These concerns should certainly be heeded as judges move forward in
applying the decision quartet in future cases, and certainly will raise
significant issues if the concerns bear out in the crucible of actual
litigation experience. However, it is submitted that with respect to most
273. Alan Rothman, And Now a Word from The Panel: 5 MDL Lessons,
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2017, 11:17 AM),
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/988626/print?section=classaction (citing
https://multiurisdictionlitigation.wordpress.com).
274. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608-10 (E.D. La. 2008);
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
275. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr.
20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L.
2010); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551-52 (E.D. La. 2009); Beck,
supra note 268.
276. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789
(2017) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
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multiple-defendant mass tort suits, there should be (as a due process
matter) one or more states other than the defendants' home states in
which a nationwide mass action could be brought in the event that the
home states themselves do not overlap. As already noted, such states
could potentially include, among other places, the state where the subject
mass accident occurred, the state where the allegedly harmful product
was designed, produced, tested or shipped, or in which the marketing
plan was managed or from which other significant case-significant
communications emanated, or where the defendants allegedly conspired.
In all likelihood, these jurisdictions, together with the defendants' "at
home" states, should bring about an appropriate state or states in which
to bring suit.
Moreover, in reading Justice Sotomayor's concerns about nationwide
actions, we should again ask the very legitimate question of whether
indeed a nationwide mass or class action is necessarily best from the
standpoint of the parties or the judicial system. In many cases, justice
may best be served by locally filed actions in given states that will be
tried, if the case does not settle, before a jury of peers in the same state.277
Filing of such localized actions in federal court, whether as a "mass
action" under the Class Action Fairness Act, traditional diversity or
federal question jurisdiction, will allow for nationwide MDL
centralization of similar cases pending nationally in one proceeding for
all pre-trial purposes as well as coordination with similar coordinated
state cases.278
As for Justice Sotomayor's posited problem of foreign country
defendants not incorporated or headquartered in the United States, a
serious issue following Daimler, a variety of options should be open for
suits against such a defendant that has caused harm here. Plainly, the
foreign company should be subject to specific jurisdiction in a state in
which it has purposefully arranged to distribute its purportedly harmful
product or communication, at least for residents of that state. Such a
company may also potentially be subject to specific jurisdiction for
nationwide claims in any state in which the company's allegedly
injurious products or communications were designed, manufactured,
tested or distributed from, where the United States advertising or
marketing was designed, or in the state of a mass accident for which the
277. In certain prescription drug litigation, for example, where the thought processes
of the plaintiffs prescribing doctor and defenses based on the plaintiffs misuse or other
pre-existing conditions present important factual issues, localized trials may present the
fairest and most effective option for both sides, but numerous plaintiffs with similar suits
nationwide would benefit from MDL centralization and state-federal court pre-trial
coordination. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005).
278. See Beck, supra note 268.
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foreign company is claimed to be responsible. 279 Even where separate
actions are brought only on behalf of residents injured in the state,
federal MDL centralization can be sought for all such suits filed in or
removed to the federal district courts, and federal-state coordination can
also be achieved when there are also similar state court actions that have
not been removed to federal court.280
There is also room allowed by the decision quartet (and good reason)
for the courts to more flexibly define the "arising out of or related to"
requirement for specific jurisdiction when necessary to prevent unjust
loss of access to our courts for claims against foreign country companies
for injury occurring here or in other similar circumstances where sensible
access to our courts is threatened. As Dean Borchers observed, the courts
before the decision quartet were applying simple "doing business"
general jurisdiction as a sort of "poorly functioning safety valve" from
otherwise unjust outcomes that would otherwise result from using rigid
definitions of claim-connection for specific jurisdiction. 281 Now, with the
decision quartet substantially cabining the requirements for general
jurisdiction, and instructing that general jurisdiction should be the
exception rather than the rule, the courts on a going-forward basis should
be vigilant in appropriate cases to allow more flexible application of the
specific jurisdiction "arising out of or related to" requirement to ensure
access to an appropriate court for suit against corporations while also
protecting against forum shopping as occurred in Bristol-Myers and other
decision quartet cases.
The sole jurisdictional due process defect overturned in
Bristol-Myers was the inclusion in that case of plaintiffs without any
claim connection to the state.282 But this should still allow for a range of
approaches to specific jurisdiction so long as the claims of all plaintiffs in
the case are connected to the defendant company's purposeful contacts
with the state. For example, where appropriate to ensure access, courts
could apply the broader "but for" claim-connection test that would permit
jurisdiction in a state in which one or more corporate contacts occurred
"but for" which all the plaintiffs alleged injuries would not have
279. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 n.3, 289, 297 (1980)
(acknowledging grounds for jurisdiction over auto manufacturer and U.S. importer).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
281. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 131, 139; see
also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132 n.9 (2014) ("[A]n imperfect safety valve that
sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction
would deny it." (citing and quoting Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra
note 26, at 139)).
282. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1781-82 (2017).
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occurred. 283 Particularly if there is no other more reasonable available
forum, and if the company has a regular business presence in the state,
the "but for" claim-connection test should certainly be fair, reasonable
and in conformity with Bristol-Myers and prior specific jurisdiction
cases. 284 The defendant company's "liberty interest" in being required to
respond to claims only in fora in which it could reasonably expect to be
sued would be satisfied because every plaintiffs claim would be "but for"
connected to the company's contacts with the forum state. 285 The state
would also have an adequate "sovereign" interest in regulating a
company with such contacts. 286 And, there would be no Bristol-Myers
forum shopping problem because all plaintiffs would be linked by the "but
for" claim connection to the forum. State courts may choose to apply a
more rigorous claim-connection test as a matter of state law, whether it
be a "proximate cause" or "substantial relation" claim-connection test, 287
but a court's decision to use the less rigorous "but for" test in appropriate
cases to protect access to its courts for deserving plaintiffs should not
present due process issues so long as there is a valid claim affiliation with
the state for all plaintiffs' claims.
Moreover, if the defendant company also does substantial business
in the state, it is submitted that such substantial non-claim connections
should be permitted to add additional support for the "reasonableness" of
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the company so long as at least
a "but for" claim-connection is presented for each individual plaintiff.288
283. See, e.g., Cortina v Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., No. 17-CV-00247-JST, 2017
WL 2793808, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (finding California claim-connection with
out-of-state plaintiffs in pharmaceutical product liability case based on California having
been one of the significant sites for allegedly deficient clinical trial reporting for the drug
leading to FDA approval); Nakaki v. Caesar's Entm't Operating Co., 2012 WL 12893849 at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (upholding jurisdiction in California federal district over
defendant Nevada hotel company for California resident's injury at a Nevada hotel where
plaintiff alleged that she was induced to come to the hotel by the hotel's advertising in
California).
284. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 208, 247, 269 (suggesting that for corporations
with substantial business contacts with the state that the dispute connection requirement
be more relaxed than for corporations with single or occasional contacts).
285. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); Genetin,
supra note 7, at 130-31.
286. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
287. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) (rejecting the
"but for" test as too unlimited and instead requiring a "substantial connection" and
cataloguing how different courts across the country have adopted "but for," "proximate
cause," "sliding scale," or "substantial connection" tests).
288. Since Int'l Shoe Co., reasonableness has long been an underlying part of due processjurisdictional analysis, stated or unstated. See supra Part I.B.3; World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 292; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); Genetin, supra note
7, at 121-35.
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This approach is different from the "sliding scale" approach utilized by
the California Supreme Court and rejected in Bristol-Myers because,
under this approach, all plaintiffs must have, at a minimum, a "but for"
claim connection to the forum state for jurisdiction.
Also, for claims against large foreign-country-headquartered
"multinational" corporations for harm caused in the United States, it is
proposed that a court could, consistent with due process as articulated
in the decision quartet, find that such a foreign company defendant is
quasi-at home for general jurisdiction (1) in the state of its United States
headquarters, or (2) the state of incorporation or principal place of
business of its main United States subsidiary or of its United States
subsidiary, division, or group whose product or communication is
specifically involved in the alleged harm at issue if specific jurisdiction is
somehow not otherwise available. 289 In this respect, it should be noted
that in Daimler, California was neither the state of incorporation nor the
principal place of business of MBUSA, Daimler's principal United States
subsidiary, and the claims asserted in that case did not involve injury in
the United States or to United States residents. 290
Finally, in today's era of internet and other similar mass marketing,
the J. McIntyre fifty-state targeting dilemma should be solved by treating
any company's regular and systematic targeting of product sales and
marketing to all fifty states as "purposeful" targeting in any state in
which injury to the plaintiff occurs, subject to a "reasonableness" analysis
as to the fairness to the defendant of exercising jurisdiction in the
particular case.291 This solution would ensure that an injured plaintiff
has access to an appropriate court to sue for injury caused by a product
purposefully marketed to and purchased in the plaintiffs state, yet afford
a reasonableness test before the imposition of jurisdiction in an
inconvenient forum. 292
Stated another way, courts should be vigilant to protect against a
scenario in which limiting personal jurisdiction to only the "general" or
"specific" paradigms has the danger of precluding necessary and
appropriate personal jurisdiction when the case comes up just short of
the most rigid tests of either paradigm but nevertheless offers fair and
reasonable corporate contacts upon which to base the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, and presents no problematic forum shopping. 293 One
289. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120-21, 138-40, 143-44, 146-47 (2014).
290. Id. at 120-21.
291. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
292. See Richman, supra note 25, at 1339-40.
293. See id. at 1340-46 (suggesting that a continuum or sliding scale approach to
personal jurisdiction would help fill the gaps between the two paradigms of general and
specific jurisdiction). For examples of other recently proposed flexible approaches, see
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hypothetical example of such a scenario might be the crash over the high
seas of an airplane manufactured in France by a company incorporated
and with a principal place of business there, operated by a U.S. airline
incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in the state
of Georgia, with both French and New Jersey resident pilots carrying
200+ United States passengers from many different states who took off
from a New York airport to Paris before crashing in the Atlantic Ocean.
Can one personal injury suit be brought on behalf of all the 200+ United
States passengers against the French manufacturer and the
Delaware/Georgia airline, along with the United States subsidiaries of
those companies, in New York under the decision quartet if the claims
are for an alleged defect in the airplane and for alleged negligence of the
pilots and maintenance crew? The foreign airplane manufacturer and
airline are not both "at home" in any single state under the paradigm
definitions. Did each of the companies' contacts with New York have a
sufficient specific jurisdictional claim-connection for all the United States
citizens' claims based on the fact that the passengers all booked this
flight to take off from New York, the manufacturer had sold and
marketed billions of dollars in planes to U.S. carriers that were often
used in New York, the airline created much of its United States
advertising in New York and displayed much of it in broadcast media
that originated in New York, and, in addition, sells tens of millions of
dollars in tickets each year in New York? A prior decision of New York's
highest court permitted such a suit on the old, pre-Daimler "doing
business" general jurisdiction grounds, 294 yet the suit would not pass
general jurisdiction muster today under Daimler and would probably
require a "but for" connection test for specific jurisdiction.295 It would
seem appropriate for the Supreme Court to address close cases like these
by allowing for a "but for" claim connection test and allowing state and
federal courts leeway in exploring the outer limits of the lines drawn in
the decision quartet to ensure that access to our courts is not
unreasonably or unjustly denied.296
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 7, at 207-08, 247, 269 (proposing that the specificjurisdiction claim-connection requirement be relaxed for a corporation which does
substantial business in a state and be more rigorous for a corporation with only a single or
occasional contacts); Genetin, supra note 7, at 162 (proposing an "interest analysis"
approach to specific jurisdiction that would allow greater flexibility).
294. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441 (N.Y. 1965).
295. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
296. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, supra note 26, at 138 (suggesting
that there is a "need to build a bridge between general and specific jurisdiction[,]" and that
a form of supplemental jurisdiction be allowed with a goal to have a single forum "resolve
conclusively all of the parties' related claims arising out of a common transaction or
occurrence.").
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Further undergirding the grounds for this Article's proposed
flexibility in application of the decision quartet's new brighter line
boundaries is the fact that each of the quartet cases addressed
problematic forum shopping in which the plaintiffs had no compelling
basis to bring the dismissed claims in the forum state. In Goodyear, the
forum shopping consisted of the plaintiffs bringing suit in North Carolina
against foreign companies whose tire products at issue were not sold in
the United States for an accident that occurred in a foreign country.
297 In
Daimler, it was Argentine plaintiffs suing a foreign parent company in
California for conduct that occurred in Argentina, when even the
company's also-sued principal United States subsidiary was not
incorporated, headquartered, or managed in California. 298 In BNSF, it
was two non-resident plaintiffs bringing employment related claims in
Montana that did not in any way arise there and in which BNSF was not
at home or even "quasi-at home." 299 And, in Bristol-Myers, it was suits
brought in California against Bristol-Myers on behalf of hundreds of
non-resident plaintiffs whose claims were totally unconnected with the
state even though the company was not at home or quasi-at home
It should be noted that another potential option would be separate suits in federal
courts in different states that are centralized into a single MDL proceeding. Federal subject
matter jurisdiction could be based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) or the Multi-Party
Multi-Forum Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012), which grants federal subject matter
jurisdiction and MDL assignment of civil actions involving disasters in which at least
seventy-five citizens of multiple states are killed in a single disaster in any state or "other
location." § 1369(a)(1).
Yet another potential answer would be Congressional legislation to address
overseas aircraft disasters (and perhaps other disasters) involving large numbers of United
States citizens and a strong connection to the United States. It could be accomplished by
amendment to the Multi-Party Multi-Forum Jurisdiction Act to provide federal nationwide
personal jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction.
Congress can also address potential shortfalls that may occur with respect to
foreign company defendants with legislation providing for federal nationwide jurisdiction
for foreign companies in the state of the company's United States principal place of business
or the state of incorporation or principal place of business of its principal United States
subsidiary. See Sachs, supra note 7, at 1303. The Court in Bristol-Myers explicitly left open
the question of whether the Fifth Amendment's due process constraints on federal court
personal jurisdiction may allow for broader jurisdictional powers than those allowed for the
states. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784
(2017) (citing Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102, n.5 (1987)).
However, it would seem beyond peradventure that Congress can provide for nationwide
personal jurisdiction for a category of cases affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
Andrews, supra note 247, at 1383-84; Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(2), supra note 7, at 446-48; Sachs, supra note 7, at 1303.
297. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918-19 (2011).
298. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120-21 (2014).
299. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553-54 (2017).
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there. 300 Read in this light, the decision quartet provides greater
simplicity and clarity of construct for due process jurisdictional analysis,
along with a strong message against forum shopping abuse, and the
necessary flexibility to allow personal jurisdiction in a manner that
protects access to our courts in accordance with our "traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice."301
F. The Decision Quartet Should Lead to More Intense Early Efforts by
Counsel in Complex Cases to Pursue Jurisdictional Discovery and to
Reach Early Agreements to Resolve Unnecessary Jurisdictional
Disputes
The stricter and brighter line rules of the Goodyear, Daimler, BNSF,
and Bristol-Myers decisions, as well as the disheartening result in the J.
McIntyre decision addressing what appears to have been "fifty-state
targeting," should lead to more intense early focus by plaintiffs on
personal jurisdictional investigation and discovery if there is going to be
any dispute about personal jurisdiction. Often, plaintiffs' counsel will sue
a parent company and as many subsidiaries as counsel believes may have
responsibility, be subject to personal jurisdiction and have the necessary
financial ability to pay a judgment. The decision quartet places a
premium on plaintiffs' counsel getting this right at the outset, and hence
will likely impel efforts at early investigation and discovery of contacts
with the forum as well as on whether there are any piercing the corporate
veil issues such as alter ego, disregard of corporate formalities, fraud and
the like, with respect to corporate subsidiaries. Most importantly, this
investigation and discovery should focus on locating a state with strong
specific jurisdiction connections such as being the place of creation,
design, production, development, distribution, approvals, marketing,
advertising, and testing of the alleged injurious product or
communication, in addition to the "at home" states of the potential
defendant company(ies). After all, Bristol-Myers could seemingly have
been decided differently if plaintiffs' counsel would have discovered that
Plavix had been invented, developed or manufactured in, or shipped to
all states from, California, or if discovery would have shown that the
national marketing or advertising plan for the drug had been developed
there. 302 Similarly, both the plurality and concurring opinions in the
300. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
301. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
302. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779. Trial Order at *1, Slemp v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 1422-CCO9326-02, 2017 WL 9732409, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017) is a recent
decision in one of multiple product liability cases brought on behalf of non-residents in
Missouri alleging that Johnson & Johnson's talcum powder caused the plaintiff's ovarian
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difficult 4-2-3 decision in J. McIntyre indicated that a different result
may have been obtained had a better record been presented of the
manufacturer's purposeful fifty-state sales efforts.303
The brighter-line tests provided by the decision quartet should also
propel thoughtful counsel on both sides to try to reach agreements that
avoid unnecessary jurisdictional disputes. For example, I teach my
Complex Civil Litigation students, based on my prior experiences as a
long-time large case litigator, that it is often in the defendants' as well as
plaintiffs' interest from a cost-effectiveness standpoint to try to reach
early agreement on personal jurisdiction issues, where feasible, such as
agreeing on just one corporate defendant in a corporate family that is
clearly subject to jurisdiction, and dismissing unnecessary affiliates or
parent companies, perhaps with the agreement that the dismissed
affiliated companies will submit to certain discovery and/or a tolling
agreement as part of the dismissal. Counsel for both sides should also
discuss potential agreements for plaintiffs to refile in a more appropriate
jurisdiction, agreements for 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) transfers or
1407 centralization in federal cases to an appropriate district or, in the
appropriate cases, simply agree on one appropriate federal or state
jurisdiction for all plaintiffs.304 It may not be possible to reach agreement
in every case, but it will certainly be worth the effort for both sides and
the courts.
CONCLUSION
The importance and impact of the decision quartet for complex civil
litigation lies in the enunciation of simpler, brighter-line and stricter due
process tests for general and specific jurisdiction, and a clear dichotomy
between general and specific jurisdiction due process analysis. The
decisions should act to protect corporate defendants from certain types of
forum shopping that previously stretched jurisdictional limits. For most
cases, the decision quartet should not result in the denial of access for
cancer. After Bristol-Myers was decided, and defendants moved after a verdict had been
rendered in favor of the plaintiff to dismiss the action on the grounds that the out-of-state
plaintiff had no claim-connection to Missouri. Plaintiffs counsel developed discovery to tie
the subject talcum powder to the state of Missouri, resulting in the trail court denying the
motion to dismiss the out-of-state plaintiffs claims.
303. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011); id. at 887, 889
(Breyer, J., concurring).
304. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (2012) (permitting the transfer of venue to another district in
which the case might have been brought "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses,
[and] in the interest of justice."); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (2012) (allowing such a transfer to
correct a venue defect); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (allowing for the transfer of a civil action
that involves common questions of fact).
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class actions or mass actions. There will often be multiple general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction options for the filing of nationwide
or multi-state class actions and mass actions addressing nationwide
misconduct, when warranted, recognizing that state-wide actions may
often be better suited given choice-of-law or other local individual
problems with a multi-state or nationwide putative class or group of
joined plaintiffs. In addition, the procedural devices available to litigants
for filing in federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, traditional
diversity and federal question jurisdiction, together with MDL
centralization, as well as the growing tradition of federal court-state
court cooperation, can be used to provide for efficient centralized
resolution of most instances of multiple separate state-resident-only
class actions, mass actions, or individual lawsuits arising out of
nationwide or multi-state corporate conduct.
Nevertheless, there is the threat of the general-specific jurisdiction
dichotomy being applied in an overly narrow way to deny access to our
courts in cases that pose no forum shopping abuse and that should, as a
matter of fairness and substantial justice, warrant personal jurisdiction.
It is these cases that the suggestions offered here are designed to assist.
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